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ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS

ON THE MEANING OF ΛΟΓΟΣ IN CERTAIN PASSAGES IN ARISTOTLE'S *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*.

PROFESSOR COOK WILSON's article under the above title in the June number of the *Classical Review* is likely to arouse both the interest and the hostility of many students of Aristotle. Many will find his great reputation and the imposing array of references sufficient warrant for translating λόγος by 'Reason' for the rest of their lives. But it may be permitted to one who is still 'living in sin' to explain why he (and possibly others) cannot accept Professor Wilson's proffered means of grace. At the same time it is only fitting to record an obligation to Professor Wilson which far outruns the point at which agreement with his view ends.

The position which I wish to defend in this article is not the direct contrary of the former thesis; but rather I wish to show that in none of the passages alleged in support of Professor Wilson's view is it impossible to avoid translating λόγος by 'Reason,' or its derivatives, without some sacrifice of the meaning of the passage. I shall also point out that in some of the passages it is impossible to adopt the version 'reason' without missing a real point in the interpretation. At the same time I must plead guilty to a prejudice (if prejudice it be) which in my mind connects the term 'Reason' with the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries in the modern world and with the Post-

Aristotelians, especially the Stoics, in the ancient. I shall add to the examination of the passages some general observations on λόγος in Aristotle.

I begin with those passages in which Professor Wilson insists that we must translate λόγος by Reason.

Nic. Eth. II. ii. 2, 1103b 31, is a well-known difficulty. Mr. Bywater suspected it, and Professor Burnet brackets the last seventeen words, on the ground that it implies that ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος is a virtue. Is it not possible to avoid this implication? Homer speaks of Nausicaa and her 'other' serving maids, of Athena apart from the 'other' suitors; Xenophon says there was no grass nor any 'other' tree; and Plato says that Socrates has been careless of business, family affairs, military offices, public speaking and 'other' magistracies. It is true that in this use ἄλλος usually has no article; but is that an insuperable difficulty? I should translate, or rather paraphrase, the passage as follows: 'First, then, that action should be in accordance with the right rule is common ground for us and the Platonists alike, and we shall take it for granted—we shall deal with the right rule hereafter, both with its real nature and with its relations to the virtues besides.' I do not see that the admitted difficulty of this passage is helped at all by writing 'right reason' for 'the right rule.' Reason is not a

virtue any more than the right rule is; at least it is quite possible to translate the passages in the sixth book without coming to that conclusion. Before leaving this passage, I might observe that all the Platonic passages, which I have been able to discover, in which the phrase *ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος* is employed, are capable of interpretation on the same lines. Cf. *Polit.* 310. C, *Phaed.* 93. E, *Laws* II. 659. D; also a similar passage in *Soph.* 239.

Nic. Eth. VI. i. 1-3. Here again I am unable to regard it as demonstrably certain that *ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος* is explicitly identified with one of the intellectual virtues. The passage may be paraphrased as follows: 'We have said before that the Mean must be chosen—neither the excess nor the defect; we have also said that the Mean in question is that stated by the right formula; we have therefore to discuss this matter. In every one of the habits of choice we have mentioned—as, indeed, in the others—there is a standard to which the man who knows the formula looks when he regulates his efforts in respect of the extremes, and there is a measure of the Means, which we say are between the excess and the deficiency, constituted in accordance with the right rule or formula. All this is true, but far from clear. Much the same might be said of other practices and pursuits of which there is knowledge to be had. You must not do too much or too little in this direction or in that; you must preserve the mean—in fact, you must follow the right rule. But if you were only told to follow the prescription of the doctor and the formulae of his art, you would still be in ignorance of the proper treatment of the body. So also with the habits of the Soul; it is not enough that our statements were true, we still require to know what the right rule is and what standard it affords.' All this is quite consistent with the view that *ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος* is not a virtue itself, but is the essence, and the formula of the essence, of every *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*. Nor does it appear that there is any obstacle to taking this line of interpretation so far as the words go.

Nic. Eth. VI. xiii. 4 and 5 is perhaps the crucial passage; for here we have

a phrase which certainly looks like an explicit identification of *ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος* with one of the intellectual virtues, viz. *φρόνησις*. As quoted in Professor Wilson's article the point of the section (which really begins with par. 3) is not readily discerned. Aristotle is here marking the development of the Socratic theory that Virtue is knowledge. The Academy has made a considerable advance on the original view of Socrates; they admit not only that virtue is a habit of choice, but also that the choice is *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*, according to the right formula; and further that the right formula is in accordance with Practical Wisdom (*φρόνησις*, which is a virtue). We (the Peripatetics) have little to add to this; we have only to point out that Practical Wisdom exists as the presence of the right rules, or formulae, in the mind of the practically wise man. This is the way in which Professor Burnet takes the passage; and it is confirmed by the places in Plato which the phrase occurs; cf. especially *Politicus* 310C *Πράττουσι μὲν δὴ οὐδ' ἐξ ἑνὸς ὀρθοῦ λόγου*, 'They act from no single correct formula,'—a dialogue which has many affinities with the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In these circumstances there does not seem to be any sufficient reason to adopt the view offered in Professor Wilson's article.

These are the passages on which we are told to rely; it is not necessary to comment on those which they carry with them. In every case it is both possible and reasonable to adopt the same line of interpretation.

Before attempting the solution of the two passages from which Professor Wilson derived his inspiration, let us consider briefly his second line of argument which is based on the quasi-personification of *λόγος* as something which speaks, is listened to, is disregarded, encourages, issues commands, and turns us away from our evil courses. In general there is nothing very violent in the metaphors employed, and nothing to suggest that 'Reason' occupied in Aristotle's mind a place at all analogous to that which it occupied in, e.g. Hooker. Aristotle, for instance, could never have written: 'The rule of

voluntary agents on earth is the sentence that Reason giveth concerning the goodness of those things which they are to do'—or if he could, it would not be 'Reason,' but 'the rule' and 'the sentence' that would be expressed by λόγος. Compared with the metaphors of Hooker in the first book of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, the expressions employed by Aristotle are almost literal.

Taking the passages *seriatim*: *Nic. Eth.* VI. i. 1, 1138b 19. 'The Mean is as the correct formula states it' can hardly be called a personification of λόγος; the formula is a proposition, and λέγει is the baldest and most natural verb for λόγος. The next passage (VI. ii. 2, 1139a 23) contains a most emphatic point, expressed by the word φάναι. Here Aristotle is drawing attention to the co-operation of judgment and appetite; the latter is a positive pursuit, the former is an affirmative proposition; hence the word φάναι. The point, therefore, is not that the λόγος speaks, but that it says 'Yes,' that it is an affirmative proposition. Moreover, in the same passage he says that the λόγος must be true and the appetite correct; so that some rendering meaning 'proposition' or 'judgment,' perhaps 'formula,' would be better than 'reason' here.

The passages from VII. and X., in which the λόγος is heard or listened to, are not incompatible with the translation 'rule.' In the former (1149a 25)—which comes in a very poetical and metaphorical section—passion hears the λόγος in a sense, but misinterprets what it hears. Greek has apparently two words for such a misinterpretation of an immediate presentation or intuition: παρορᾶν and παρακούειν; of these the latter is obviously the more appropriate here. It is at least as natural to translate 'rule' as to write 'Reason.' In this passage it is 'the rule' that is presented, but is mis-heard or misinterpreted. In the next (1179b 26), the man who is at the mercy of his environment will not listen to the words of one who would dissuade him. And later in the same section the contrast seems to be between physical compulsion and mere talking; sermons are of no avail,

except where the mind is ready to receive them.

Nic. Eth. I. xiii. 15, 1102b 14, seems to be open to the same line of interpretation. What we approve is the rule which both the morally strong and the morally weak allow—though the former acts with it and the latter against it; we also approve the part of the soul which has the rule or plan—for that is the same in both strong and weak: that part of the soul (NOT the λόγος) encourages them both alike in the right direction; though with different success, for there is another 'part' which resists the rule or plan. As Professor Burnet rightly points out the whole passage is Platonic in language as well as in theory. The part of the Soul in question might be called 'the Reason,' but it is not the λόγος but that which has the λόγος.

The next group of passages, in which the idea of commanding is present, offers no objection to the interpretation here defended. It would be wearisome to take every passage in detail. There does not appear to be any difficulty, either in Greek or in English, in speaking of a rule 'prescribing,' or of 'setting oneself against' a rule or plan. Nor do the briefer forms of saying 'as the rule ordains' present the smallest difficulty. 'Ἰατρική' also 'orders' (κελεύει) in VI. i.2, 1138b 31; and 'Ἰατρική' is just a set of formulae.

The group of passages referred to on p. 115, at the top of the first column, adds nothing to the argument. The first comes from a sentence which is certainly an interpolation. In addition to Professor Burnet's arguments, which would be enough to discredit that sentence, I would point out that in the context it is more natural to interpret 'that which has the plan' or 'that which can give an account of itself,' not as part of the Soul, but an animal. We set aside the life which consists in mere nutrition and growth; next comes the life of sensation; but this belongs as common property to the horse also, and the ox and every animal. There remains the practical life of the animal which can give an account of itself. Some reader has mistaken the phrase for its more familiar meaning, and has interpolated

the sentence with ἐπιπειθὲς in it. As Professor Burnet has explained, this word alone is enough to make it suspicious. The second passage is more like a personification than any other quoted. At the same time the word *πειθαρχεῖν* is sometimes used for obedience to laws, and in one passage in Comedy for a ship 'obeying' the rudder. The remaining passages are from the last chapter of the first book, a popular exposition of the psychological views of the Academy: and in the course of it there *may* be two places where Aristotle writes *λόγος* as an elliptical expression for τὸ λόγον ἔχον. In passages like this he is frequently inclined to employ a somewhat more lively and poetical style of expression than he usually does. But even here (the two places are 1102b 17 and 24) it is at least as reasonable to suppose that he means the rule or plan quite strictly, and that the phrases 'fighting and resisting the rule' and 'setting itself against it and withstanding it' are put in expressly for the purpose of showing that *παρὰ τὸν λόγον* is not to be taken to mean 'besides the part which has the plan,' but, literally, are to be taken as 'contrary to the rule.' Indeed, it is quite possible that he never uses *λόγος* for τὸ λόγον ἔχον.

The passages from the sixth book do not appear to make the rendering 'Reason' inevitable. In some places 'judgment' seems to be the best version: e.g. VI. ii. 4, where the phrase means 'the judgment which states the aim of the act.' It is not, surely, permissible to argue that because that judgment is impossible *without* Mind (or Reason) and understanding, it is therefore identical with Reason.

The passages from the seventh book add nothing to the strength of Professor Wilson's argument; and one of them cannot possibly mean Reason; I refer to VII. iv. 2, 1147b 31. Here the context shows that persons with a special moral weakness are to the generally morally weak as the Olympian victor whose name was Man is to the generalised humanity expressed in the definition of 'man'; in the latter case we have to add to the general formula the words 'who won the boxing-match at Olympia

in 456 B.C.,' and in the former case we have to add to the general formula of moral weakness the words 'in respect of money—or of honour.' It is to be noticed that the persons in question are not moral idiots, but only morally weak, and that in a special direction; it is thus quite to the point to add the words τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, and in the context it is difficult to resist the paraphrase: 'those that transgress the right rule of life—which they know quite well—in these respects, we do not describe as morally weak without qualification; but we add . . .' The illustration from the definitory formula of 'man' seems to confirm this interpretation. It is not the Reason that is in them that they transgress, for it is possible to do many unreasonable things without being morally weak; but it is not possible to be ἀκρατής without at once knowing the right rule and acting in the opposite direction.

The examination of these passages—and others like them—does not afford any very strong grounds for supposing that the two texts which are printed at the beginning of Professor Wilson's article should be interpreted on different lines. The first, *Nic. Eth.* II. iii. 5, occurs in a passage containing more than one direct reference to the Academy; cf. the following words and Professor Burnet's note *ad loc.* This is enough to dispose of the objection that the rule has not been stated explicitly yet in the text. The rule was a well-known feature of the doctrine of the Academy; it begins in Plato himself, as we have seen, and was, perhaps, further emphasised by his nephew and successor, to whom the next words certainly refer. In the context the balance of probability seems to be in favour of paraphrasing the passage thus: 'It is the influence of pleasures and pains that produces bad characters—pursuing the wrong pleasures and avoiding the wrong pains, or pursuing and avoiding them at the wrong times, or in the wrong manner, or in any other of the ways of going wrong that are determined by the formula of the rule.'

The second passage is the well-known definition of a goodness of character (*Nic. Eth.* II. vi. 15, 1106b 36), as 'an

acquired habit of choice, the differentia of which is that it is a Mean relatively to the persons concerned; it is determined by the formula or rule of proportion, viz. the rule by which the good citizen would determine it.' By the term 'good citizen' I hope to avoid suggesting the Wise Man of the later schools.

I cannot see that either of these paraphrases would be improved by the importation of the term 'Reason'; the word 'rule,' on the other hand, makes a definite reference to the contemporary theory of the Academy, and the word 'formula' serves to connect the passages with the most technical of Aristotelian uses of the word *λόγος*. And in the *Ethics* these are the poles of Aristotle's thought. Outwardly, he is in nearly every place speaking to an audience to which the language of Plato and the popularisations of his thought by his successors were quite familiar; that was the basis from which he started to educate men up to the task of ruling. On the other hand, there is running through the treatise an under-current of allusion to his own theory; there are hints to those who know the pure doctrine of the *De Anima* in the last chapter of the first book, while the broad outline there adopted is frankly Academic. It would not be less true than an epigram usually is to say that he composed the work with the Academy in his eye and his own theory at the back of his head. And especially in the case of such a crucial word as *λόγος* we ought to bear this in mind in our interpretations. It is not a question of the possibility of a single word, nor even a question of taste, but a question of one of the means (and not an unimportant one) of conceiving the relations of the various books in the Aristotelian Corpus in respect of the theory they present.

In this connection it is worth while observing that of all the passages referred to the heading 'cogitandi ac ratiocinandi facultas' in Bonitz's Index one each comes from the *Organon* and the *Rhetoric*; five come from the *De Anima*; seven from the *Metaphysics*; thirteen from the *Politics*; three from the *Magna Moralia*; six from the *Eudemian Ethics*; and forty from the *Ethics*. In not one of the places in the last-named can I find 'Reason' the inevitable, or even the best, translation. But even supposing that there were in all the works of Aristotle (and some not by him) seventy-six places in which *λόγος* did mean Reason, there would be still an overwhelming probability against that meaning in any given place; that is, we ought to try in any given case to render the passage by the more usual translation—which is 'the formula of the essence' or 'the definition' or 'the rule' or 'the plan'—before resorting to the exceptional meaning. But so far from there being seventy-six such indubitable places, it is to be questioned if there are even six genuine places in which the translation must be Reason.

But it was no part of my intention to maintain that *λόγος* never meant Reason in Aristotle; I only desired to show that to translate it by Reason in the group of places to which Professor Wilson has drawn attention is never quite inevitable, and frequently involves a sacrifice of the meaning—especially that part of the meaning which consists in the reference to the cotemporary Academy. I had intended to append some more general account of the use of the term in Aristotle's works apart from the *Ethics*, but it does not now seem essential to my argument.

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ON THE MEANING OF ΛΟΓΟΣ IN ARISTOTLE'S *ETHICS*.

I AM very sorry that Professor Cook Wilson has been induced to retract the interpretation of ὁρισμένη λόγῳ in *Eth. Nic.* 1107^a 1 which he has hitherto adopted.¹ His authority in such matters is so great that his pronouncement will be widely regarded as settling the question. At the same time I cannot help thinking that he has been too easily moved, and I venture most respectfully to submit one or two pleas in arrest of judgment.

I am not concerned with the difficulty which arises from rendering λόγος differently at 1104^b 23 and 1106^b 36 *sqq.*; for I take it to mean 'rule' in both passages. Nor am I troubled by the fact that τοῦ λόγου is introduced in the first passage without any explanation, though the definition has not yet appeared in the text and is not developed till later on. The theory of the λόγος or ὀρθὸς λόγος belongs to the Academy (κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω 1103^b 32) and was, of course, familiar to Aristotle's audience. The only points with which I have to deal are (1) the personification of the λόγος and (2) its relation to νόμος.

It must be remembered that λέγειν in Greek has an epitactic force like the French *dire* and the English 'tell'; and, when I translate it by 'rule,' I mean, in the first place, 'rule' in the sense in which we speak of a rule of conduct. This use of λόγος is found, for instance, in Plato's *Crito* 46^b. If the words ὡς ἐγὼ . . . οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ stood alone, we should doubtless be tempted to render λόγος here by 'reason.' That cannot be right, however; for Socrates continues ὅς ἂν μοι λογιζόμενῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται, and we cannot attribute several 'reasons' to him. This is borne out by the words τοὺς δὲ λόγους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, and a little later (46^d) this particular λόγος is referred to by the words πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκαστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι . . . δεῖ κ.τ.λ. This may serve to justify the rendering 'rule' in all cases where there is a question of heeding or obeying a λόγος.

The same thing holds good with regard to passages where we read that the λόγος (or the ὀρθὸς λόγος) λέγει, κελεύει, προστάττει or the like. If λόγος is an epitactic 'rule,' there is no reason why it should not be personified just like νόμος, and we can quite well say ὁ νόμος λέγει, κελεύει, προστάττει. This consideration explains more than one difficult passage in Plato. In *Rep.* IV. 442^c 2 the only reading which has any authority is τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μὴ. The reading τοῦ λόγου here is merely a conjecture of Cardinal Bessarion's, and the editors follow him because they imagine λόγος to mean 'reason' and do not, therefore, understand the plural. If we translate 'rules' and identify these with the δόγματα ('rulings') of the ἄρχοντες (414^b), we shall see what the text means. In *Timaeus* 70^a we should be inclined to take τοῦ λόγου κατήκουσιν ὄν as the equivalent of τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κατήκουσιν ὄν, but two or three lines below we have the same thing referred to by the words τῷ τ' ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ (πείθεσθαι) which can hardly mean anything but 'the order and rule.'

When the λόγος (or ὀρθὸς λόγος) is brought into connexion with the νόμος, it is to be understood, I think, as ὁ λέγει ὁ νόμος. This comes out very well in Plato's *Laws* 659^d where παιδεία is defined as ἡ παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγή πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον. Or, as in *Eth. Nic.* 1180^a 21 the νόμος is itself a 'rule' proceeding from φρόνησις and νοῦς, and differing from other λόγοι in virtue of its ἀναγκαστικὴ δύναμις. From this point of view there is no difficulty whatever in identifying ὀρθὴ τάξις with ὀρθὸς λόγος, and that without adopting the translation 'reason.'

I have still to deal with two passages where the ὀρθὸς λόγος seems to be explicitly identified with φρόνησις. These are:

(a) *Eth. Nic.* 1103^b 33, τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς.

(b) *Ib.* 1144^b 27, ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν.

¹ See above, pp. 113 *sqq.*

I believe that both these passages can be interpreted without making λόγος mean 'reason,' and I hope to show that they must be. We get the hint, I think, from 1138^b 32, where ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος is paralleled by ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. If now we remember such passages as *Met.* Λ, 3. 1070^a 30 ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγείας ἐστίν and *ib.* 4. 1070^b 32 ὑγεία γὰρ πῶς ἡ ἰατρικὴ, and if we bear in mind the whole doctrine of the formal and efficient cause which these passages involve, we shall easily understand how Aristotle could on occasion seem to identify the ὀρθὸς λόγος with the ἀρετὴ of φρόνησις. In fact, φρόνησις is the λόγος τῆς ἀρετῆς in exactly the same sense as ἰατρικὴ is the λόγος τῆς ὑγείας, and the ὀρθὸς λόγος in the soul of the φρόνιμος is in a sense (πῶς) φρόνησις, in the same sense, namely, that the λόγος of health in the soul of the ἰατρός (ὁ ταύτην ἔχων, sc. τὴν ἰατρικὴν) is the art of medicine. But the λόγος of health is clearly not 'reason' in any sense of that ambiguous term. It is the 'form' of health, and that form is also the

'rule' which prescribes the due κρᾶσις and συμμετρία of the 'opposites.' I cannot believe that any rendering of λόγος is admissible in the *Ethics* which is not applicable to the ἀρετὴ σώματος as well as to the ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς. The whole system depends on the parallelism of these two.

To avoid misunderstanding, I should add that I do not for a moment mean to imply any doubt that the λόγος of the *Ethics* is a *ratio*. I hold, on the contrary, that the *Ethics* is faithful to the Pythagorean tradition which extended the doctrine of ἀρμονία to medicine first and afterwards to conduct. I am only concerned to show how the idiom of the Greek language made it possible for this mathematical conception to acquire an imperative character.

I am not presuming to instruct Professor Cook Wilson in these matters; for in one way or another I learnt them mainly from him. My remarks are intended for those who still regard the *Ethics* as a self-explanatory work.

JOHN BURNET.

IN PROPERTIUM RETRACTATIONES SELECTAE.

I iv 16.

hoc magis accepta fallit uterque fide.

For *fallit* read *pallet* (= *perdit* *amat* as I i 22, I ix 17).

I vi 17.

osculaue opposito dicat sibi debita vento.

debita seems to require that *opposito* shall bear the sense of 'pledged'; if so, for *vento* we must substitute something capable of being pledged. I suggest

osculaue opposito dicat sibi debita *voto*.

I viii 46.

ista meam norit gloria canitiem.

Read

iusta meam norit gloria canitiem.

Cf.

et vitae et mortis gloria iusta meae (II i. 74).

I xvi 2.

ianua *Tarpeiae* nota pudicitiae.

No meaning can be found for *Tarpeiae*; the word is probably imported

from IV iv. Read either *patriciae* or *perpetuae*.

I xvi 47.

sic ego nunc dominae vitii et semper *amantis* fletibus.

For *amantis*, a dittograph from v. 45, perhaps *inultis*.

I xvii 3.

nec mihi Cassiope solito visura carinam.

Read

nec mihi Cassiopa *solvit* *Cynosura* carinam.

Propertius is weather-bound at Cassiope (or Cassope). *Cynosura* would be a star of release to him, just as Calchas (in IV i 109):

Aulide . . . solvit . . . rates.

II i 37.

Theseus infernis, superis testatur Achilles
hic Ixioniden, ille Menoetiaden.

The context seems to require a concessive; read *testator*.

II iii 27.

non non humani partus sunt talia dona :
ista decem menses non peperere bona.

The text could be relieved of an improbable tautology by reading *non non humani captus*.

II vi 5.

nec quae {deletas *Nfv*} potuit componere
{delectas *FDV*} Thebas.

deletas is, I fear, not sincere testimony. For *delectas* we may restore *desertas* with tolerable certainty, since at I xiii 16

et flere {inlectis
in lectis} Galle diu manibus.

'*insertis* . . . manibus' alone gives the required gesture (cf. III xiv 30)—to clasp hands.

II vi 12.

me soror et cum qua dormit amica simul.

The low Latinity of *simul* for *uno in lecto* shows that this passage is rather deeply corrupted. I guess that *et cum qua* should be *quaecumque*, and that *simul* represents *sinu*. If *sinu*, then *tuo* is required. And one is forced to the painful conclusion that *soror* is a patch put on to mend the mischief which was caused by reading first *et cumque*, then *et cum qua* for *quaecumque*. We never hear of Cynthia having a sister; she wasn't the kind of woman that would have a sister; they did not hunt in couples at Rome as they did in a palatial. Read therefore

me quaecumque tuo dormit amica sinu.

II ix 13.

foedavitque comas et tanti corpus Achilli
maximaque in parva sustulit ossa manu.

Achilli is hardly credible after *Achillen* in v. 9. *Aen.* i 486 would suggest a reading:

et tanti corpus amici.

But perhaps some case of *Achious* is likelier.

15. For

cum tibi nec Peleus aderat nec caerula mater
read *cui tum*.

17.

tunc igitur {uiris FN
ueris &
castis DV} gaudebat Graecia natis.

curis, 'passionate devotion' (as in the Elegists *passim*), is the word which alike the reading of *FN* and the probabilities of the context commend. The variant in *DV* does not look like an interpolation, *veris* being so much more obvious. I take it there was (as is common in MSS.) an exchange of noun and epithet, i.e. the original of our MSS. bore

tunc igitur {curis
castis} gaudebat Graecia {castis.
curis.

II x 23.

sic nos nunc, inopes laudis, consendere carmen
pauperibus sacris vilia tura damus.

I showed (in *Classical Review*, 1911, p. 136) that the evidence of Val. Maximus, II viii 5 and V vi proves *inopes laudis* to be as inseparably single an epithet as if it were *inglori*: which leaves *consendere carmen* without any possible construction. I suggested *poscente camena*, to which a subsequent critic objected, not without reason. But *inopes laudis* still requires us to get rid of *consendere carmen*.

Ovid, *ex Ponto* II i 57, furnishes a clue:

te quoque victorem Tarpeias scandere in arces
laeta coronatis Roma videbit equis.

Read

cum scandis in arcem.

carmen is an anagram of *narcem*.

II xiii 47.

quis tam longaeuae minuisset fata senectae
gallicus iliadis miles in aggeribus?
non aut Antilochi vidisset corpus humari
diceret aut 'O Mors, cur mihi sera venis?'

Some verses from A. L., *Carm. Epigr.* (Bücheler-Riese) will give the model for our first line:

quod si longa magis duxissent fila sorores (456).
quod si longa magis nexissent stamina Parcae (822).

quod si longa tuae mansissent tempora vitae (1166).

Just as one may certainly in I xix 17 for {longae te} restore *longaevae*, so here the converse error appears certain:

longa suae minuisset fata senectae.

Furthermore, the A. L. type is a conditional. Livineius saw that a conditional was wanted, but rather than

his *cui si tam longae* (which fails to account for *longaevae*) we must read:

qui si longa suae minuisset fata senectae.

And now for the pentameter. Mr. Housman has made justly merry over the *gallicus* of the MSS. Among many silly suggestions (such as *bellicus*) Markland divined the necessary and perfect word, *saucius*. Most probably some lost Greek epigram in the manner of A. P. ix 157 on the theme ἔθανεν χάριτ' ἰγέρων Πύλιος had the original of *saucius* in a τραυματίας. Cf. Dio. Chrys. xi 117 (p. 145, v. Arnim) ἐτρώθη δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Μέμνων ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀντιλόχου καὶ ἀποκοιζόμενος τραυματίας τελευτᾷ κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν. *Saucius miles* = τραυματίας. But Markland did not point out that the error arose from misreading (as anyone may do) an Irish elongated *u* as a double *l*. This and a similar Irish error (*ce* = *a*) account for the MSS. at IV xi 24 offering *falla* instead of *fauce*.

II xv 27, 8.

exemplo uinctae tibi sint in amore columbae
masculus et { totum *O* } femina coniugium.
 { tutum *s* }

totum coniugium has no sense. St. Paulinus Nolanus, whose memory was stored with Propertian phrases, has a line which gives the hint how to emend it:

illa pia^e turtur cognata columbae
(Carm. XXIII 11).

turtur femina and *columbus* or *columba masculus* make the perfect sentimental pair. Read:

exemplo uinctum tibi sint in amore columbus
masculus et turtur femina coniugium.

The arrangement of the apposition is both idiomatic and characteristically Propertian.

II xv 41.

qualem si cuncti { cuperent *NDV* } decurrere uitam.
 { vellent *d* }
 { vellem *F* }

cuperent was too outrageously queer for the Humanists, who imported that *vellent*. *vellem* can hardly be anything but an interpolation. But we need do no violence to the MSS. if we read:

qualem si cuncti inciperent decurrere uitam.
Propertius uses *incipere* as a metrical

convenience (II xix 19, xv 33, III iv 16). Cf. Ter. *And.* 493.

II xvi 32.

an dolor hic vitiis nescit abesse suis?

Surely this ought to be

an dolor *his* vitiis nescit abesse *suis*?

The *vitia* do not belong to the *dolor*, but the *dolor* to the *vitia*.

II xxiv 13.

et cupit iratum talos me poscere eburnos.

The *et modo* of v. 11 requires us to replace *iratum* by *interdum*. Cf. I iii 41-43.

II xxv 1, 2.

unica nata meo pulcherrima cura dolori

excludit quoniam sors mea saepe { venit *N'*.
 { veni *cell*.

To begin with, can this astonishing *unica* be anything but *Cynthia*, with the initial left out for the rubricator to illumine?

Cynthia, nata meo (pulcherrima cura) dolori.

To proceed: the vulgate text makes him promise *Cynthia* a literary immortality *because* she is so sparing of her favours: surely an unusual weakness in a poet, or even in a man, unless he were of the 'quite nice' kind: and it was not a quite nice person who penned

Falsa est ista tuae, mulier, fiducia formae.

I suppose, on the contrary, that he appeals to her to do something in return for which he promises her fame; and that v. 2 should begin with an imperative. The minimum of change gives us *exaudi* for *excludi*. The Ovid lexicon will furnish instances of *exaudi* = 'O hear my prayer.' Of the *tquoniam* one might make *atque utinam*. To provide a subjunctive, read *velis* for

{ venit }
{ veni } of the MSS. Finally, for *sors*
{ venis }
mea, impossible as a vocative, *spes mea*.
exaudi, atque utinam, spes mea, saepe velis!

II xxv 39.

at vos qui officia in multis revocatis amores
quantum sic cruciat lumina { vestra *DV* } dolor!
 { nostra *NFL* }

For *officia*, metrically suspect and obscure in meaning, substitute *vacua*. *f* for *v* is a standard corruption in the

MS. tradition of Propertius (*c.g.* II vi 24). Mr. Housman has shown that *vacare* was written *vocare* (II xxvi 54). Possibly Propertius spelt *vacuus* in the archaic fashion as *vocivos*. *vacare* is well known as a technical term of erotic, meaning 'not to be in love with anybody just at present' (*c.g.* I xiii 2, I xix 6). The construction will be: 'at vos qui vacua lumina in multos amores revocatis, quantum (quantus *Heinsius*) sic dolor lumina vestra cruciat!'

II xxv 45.

illaque plebeio vel sit sandycis amictu.

I suggest

pallaque plebeio vel sit sandycina tinctu.

II xxvii 6. For

et maris et terrae caeca pericla *viae*

read

. . . caeca pericla *time*.

Time stands thus in IV i 150, and Lachmann reads in I v 8

molliter irasci non solet illa: *time*!

II xxviii 22.

haec eadem Persei nobilis uxor *erat* MSS.

Read *ovat*.

II xxix 3, 4.

obvia nescioquot pueri mihi turba minuta
venerat, hos vetuit me numerare timor.

Heinsius corrected *minuta* to *minuti*.

Propertius does use some pluperfects for aorists, but usually as a metrical convenience. If we accept *Heinsius'* correction, vastly superior in idiom and elegance as it is, not only the tense, but the number is offensive in *venerat*. He may say *obvia turba* because his verse will not admit *obviam*, but the *pueri minuti* remain the true subject. I suspect that he wrote

obvia *venerunt* pueri mihi turba minuti
nescioquot (vetuit me numerare timor),

in which *nescioquot* no longer disturbs the chiasmic symmetry, but directly adjoins the parenthesis which explains it.

II xxix 5.

aspice ut in toto nullus mihi corpore surgat
spiritus admisso notus adulterio.

For *notus* Marcellus conjectured *motus*, Burmann *natus*. Perhaps one should read:

spiritus admisso *sontis* adulterio,

'the (agitated) breathing of one who has been guilty of an act of adultery.' The ablative would be like

fraterno sanguine sontem (Ov. *M.* xi 268).

II xxix 41.

sic ego tam sancti $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{custodereludor } N \\ \text{custoderector } L \\ \text{custodisrektor } F \\ \text{custosrecludor } DV \end{array} \right\} \text{amoris.}$

This jumble of rubbish yields a remarkable witness to the integrity of *N*; hardly more than a redivision of the letters is necessary, and you can see the original

casto dare ludos amori.

But the resulting

sic ego tam sancti casto dare ludos amori

had itself evidently been tampered with. I fancy that a further stage in the corruption was

casto,
sancto,

and the gloss being foisted into the text expelled the verb which is required to give a construction to *dare*, viz. *cogor*. Read:

sic ego tam sancto dare ludos cogor amori.

The genitives *sancti* . . . *amoris* were of course corruptions consequent upon *custode*.

II xxxii 3-6.

nam quid Praenesti dubias, O Cynthia, sortis,
quid petis Aeaei moenia Telegoni?

curva te } Herculeum deportant esseda Tibur?
cur vatem }

appia cur totiens te via $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ducit } Nf \\ \text{ducit } cett. \\ \text{ducis } s. \end{array} \right\} \text{anum } O. \\ \text{anus } vbs.$

In v. 5 *cur tua te* may be accepted as one of Baehrens' very few happy conjectures; for never had a scholar so good an eye for seeing where something was wrong with a text, and so bungling a touch for correcting it. V. 6 remains one of the famous cruces.

Now first note that since a town is named in each of the three preceding lines, we should expect yet another town to be named in v. 6. Next, that *te* . . . *anum*, if you bring the letters together, give the name of a town, a fashionable inland change from Baiae (Hor. *Epist.* I i 86), Teanum, commonly called Teanum Sidicinum. This word *Sidicina* I conjecture to be latent under the jumble of letters from which the

scribe of N faithfully, so far, copied *dicit* and not *ducit*. If *Sidicina* be right, then for *appia* we must restore *oppida*. *Teanum* was a gloss on *oppida Sidicina*.

teanum
oppida cur totiens ad Sidicina. . . .

via came in after *oppida* had been corrupted into *Appia*. What word, then, has *anum* expelled from the verse-ending? I cannot think of anything better than *redis* or *via est*, unless one prefers

oppida cur totiens te Sidicina vident?

Cf. a few lines lower down (9-10):

cur videt accensis devotam currere taedis
in (*read te*) Nemus et Triviae lumina ferre
deae?

15, 16.

et leviter {nymphis} tota crepitantibus urbe
 {lymphis}
cum subito Triton ore recondit aquam.

There is no question of fountains playing all over the town, only in these particular gardens of the Porticus Pompeia. Read:

et leviter lymphis torti crepitantibus imbres
cum subito Triton ore recludit aquam.

61.

quod si tu Graias {tuque es *NFL*} imitata
 {sive es *DV*} Latinas,
semper vive meo libera iudicio.

A reading which reconciles the two variants and suits the context is:

quod si tu Graias *vivesque* imitata Latinas
semper vive meo libera iudicio.

II xxxiv 83.

nec minor his animis, aut si (ut sit *Housman*)
minor ore, canorus
anseris indocto carmine cessit olor.

The soundness of the first half-line is remarkably confirmed by Paulinus Nolanus (xxvii 313):

unde mihi hos animos? quae me levat aura
superbum?

He is disclaiming the courage for epic adventure. Propertius' swan suggests to him the Horatian description of Pindar (*Odes*, IV ii 25).

93.

Cynthia quinetiam uersu laudata Properti,
hos inter si me ponere Fama uolet.

quinetiam probably conceals the missing future verb. Read:

Cynthia *vincet* eas (or *eam*) uersu laudata Properti.

III vii 45, 6.

viveret ante suos dulcis conviva Penates

pauper at { in terra } {nilubiflere *NLF*}
 {interea *F*} {nilnisiflere *DV*}
 {potest *O*.
 {potes *s*.

Let us start from these two fixed points: (1) No Latin writer could say *viveret conviva*, and (2) *viveret ante suos penates* is nonsense. Problem: to find a verb palaeographically apt for corruption into *viveret* and which suits the character *conviva* and the scene *ante Penates*. The word *biberet* fulfils all these conditions. The interchange of *b* and *v* is well known. The rearrangement of the words in the line is consequent upon this first error. Replace them therefore:

ante suos biberet dulcis conviva Penates.

And now that the central idea of the picture, viz. drinking, is restored, we have a clue to repair the pentameter by. Take the letters *ni* | *lubif* | *lere* *potens* and divide them at the uprights; three germane words begin faintly to appear. *ni* is for *ui*, that is, <g>*ui*, *lubif* is *bibit*, *lere* is *aere*. The last word should be *potens*:

ante suos biberet dulcis conviva Penates;

pauper, at interea (*F*) qui bibit, aere potens.

'He would be drinking in jolly company by his fireside; not rich, but, never mind, while a man is drinking he is a millionaire for the time.'

potens with an ablative hardly needs an illustration, but Horace will serve:

Veneris muneribus potens (*Od.* IV x 1);

or Propertius:

nam quantum ferro tantum pietate potentes
(III xxii 21).

III viii 13.

custodum gregibus circa se stipat euntem,
seu sequitur medias, Maenas ut icta, vias;
seu timidam crebro dementia somnia terrent,
seu miseram in tabula picta puella movet.

The first of these lines plainly requires a *sive*; also it contains one plainly superfluous word *circa*. I take it that *circa* is a misreading of *sive ea*, and that the corruption has, as often happens, been patched over by rearrangement. Read:

sive ea custodum gregibus se stipat euntem etc.

This seems palaeographically easier than Heinsius'

custodum grege seu circa se stipat euntem,

or Burmann's

custodum gregibus seu quum se stipat euntem.

III ix 23-26.

cum tibi Romano dominas in honore securis
et liceat medio ponere iura foro,
uel tibi Medorum pugnaces ire per hostis
atque onerare tuam fixa per arma domum. . .

One simple hypothesis will explain all the complication of oddities in this passage: *Romano honore, dominas secures, Medorum hostis.*

It is to suppose that a vertical dislocation has taken place at the third letter in each of the three lines—i.e., two words have been shifted up into the line above that where they ought to be.

24, 25 should then read:

et tibi Romano ponere iura foro
vel liceat medio pugnaces ire per hostes.

What about 23? We have to deal with

cum tibi dominas in honore securis

for I assume the *tibi* to be sound. What is to be supplied?—i.e., What has *romano*, intruding from below, displaced here? The missing word must be (1) one that is liable to be confused with *romano*, and (2) a genitive to qualify *dominas*. *Terrarum* fulfils the conditions; so would *uel rerum*:

cum tibi terrarum dominas in honore securis,
or

cum tibi vel rerum dominas in honore securis.

Note that in II vii 15, for

quod si romanae comitarent castra puellae

(as I now agree with Scaliger and Passerat in reading), the MSS. offer

quod si uerameae.

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REVIEWS

HUDE'S *LYSIAS*.

Lysiae Orationes recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit CAROLUS HUDE, Ph.D. Pp. x+272 (the latter not numbered, except with the pages of Stephanus). Date of Preface, December 1, 1911; date of publication, December 19, 1912. Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano. Cloth, 3s. 6d.; paper covers, 3s.

THE *editio princeps* of Lysias is included in the first volume of the *Orationes Rhetorum Graecorum* published by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1513. Among later editions may be mentioned those of Henricus Stephanus in the *Oratores Graeci*, Paris, 1575; John Taylor, Cambridge, 1739; Reiske, Leipzig, 1772; and Auger, Paris, 1783. In the nineteenth century Lysias was edited, in the *Oratores Attici*, by Bekker, Oxford, 1822 f., and Berlin, 1823 f., and by Baiter and Sauppe, Zürich, 1838; and, separately, by Scheibe in 1852 (ed. 2, 1862), Westermann, 1854, Cobet, 1863, and

Herwerden, 1899. Scheibe's Teubner text is now superseded by that of Thelheim, 1901. Among editions of *Select Speeches* may be named those with German notes by Rauchenstein in 1848 and Frohberger in 1866, which have been repeatedly revised since the above dates, and those with English notes by W. A. Stevens, Chicago, 1876 and 1878, and M. H. Morgan, Boston, 1895, and by R. C. Jebb, in *Selections from the Attic Orators*, 1880 and 1888, and E. S. Shuckburgh, 1882 and 1885, etc.

The primary MS of Lysias, Palatinus X, No. 88 in the Heidelberg Library, was written in the twelfth century by one Theodorus, a name very frequent in the Byzantine age. It was formerly preserved in Nicaea, the celebrated Bithynian city which, under Theodorus Lascaris (1206-1222), became for a time the capital of Western Asia. When the Greeks recovered Constantinople in 1261, the MS may well have been taken to the city which

continued to be their capital until its capture by the Turks in 1453. Even before the fall of Constantinople the MS (like many others) may have been removed to the safe seclusion of the monasteries of Mount Athos. In the preface to the *editio princeps*, Aldus Manutius, after mentioning Lysias and Aeschines, says that many of the speeches of the orators included in the same edition *latebant in Atho*, until Janus Lascaris, who had been sent to the East by Lorenzo dei Medici, brought these and many other MSS to Florence.¹ Later in the fifteenth century the primary MS was repeatedly transcribed, and some at least of these transcripts were probably made in Florence, where they are still preserved. Either the primary MS, or a transcript of the same, was used in Venice for the *editio princeps* in 1513. From Venice or Florence this primary MS may have been taken to Heidelberg by one of the several scholars who formed the links between Italy and Germany during the Revival of Learning. When Heidelberg was captured by Tilly in 1622, the library of the capital of the Palatinate was assigned, as part of the spoils of war, to Maximilian of Bavaria, and was presented by him to Pope Gregory XV, who sent a renegade Greek, Leo Allatius, to superintend its transfer to the Vatican in the following year. Sauppe begins the sentence, in which he correctly states the vicissitudes of the MS, with the following words: 'Ex Italia Heidelbergam allatus est, Heidelbergam Leo Allatius anno 1622 Romam abstulit . . .' Dr. C. Hude, the editor of the text now under review, condenses the whole sentence thus: 'Ex Italia

Heidelbergam allatus est, anno 1622 Romam revertit, anno 1797 Lutetiam Parisiorum asportatus est, anno denique 1815 Heidelbergam rediit.' The words which I have printed in italics, *Romam revertit*, imply that the MS was formerly in Rome, and that it naturally returned thither, whereas it seems more probable that it was formerly in Venice or in Florence.

Dr. Hude, a member of the Royal Danish Academy and Rector of the Danish School of Frederiksborg, north of Copenhagen, is already favourably known to scholars as an editor of Herodotus in the same series, and of two editions of Thucydides, published by Teubner. For the present text of Lysias he has himself minutely collated the Heidelberg MS, which had already been collated, in whole or in part, or specially examined, by at least nine other scholars. He has also recorded nearly all the readings of the fifteenth-century Florence MS, C (Laur. lvii. 4), which Bekker made the basis of his text of 1822 f., but which Sauppe in his celebrated *Epistola ad Hermannum* (1841) proved to be only an intelligently copied and occasionally interpolated transcript of X. Thus the readings of this MS, where it diverges from X, are of no primary authority, but are to be regarded as the conjectures of a capable Greek scholar. Some good examples of the corrections tacitly introduced by this copyist may be gleaned from Dr. Hude's critical notes: *Or.* 14 § 14, οἱ δὲ ψιλοὶ (for φίλοι) ἐστρατεύοντο; *Or.* 19 § 50, Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων (for ἀπόντων) ἀκηκοότων; and *Or.* 23 § 14, ἐπισκεψάμενος (for ἐπισκεψάμενος) . . . τῷ μάρτυρι οὐκ ἐπέξε- ἦλθεν. Dr. Hude agrees with Sauppe in his general opinion of C, and states the result of his own record of its readings in the following terms: 'Quicumque hanc editionem cum superioribus comparaverit, facile apparebit [some scholars might prefer the personal *intellegit* to the impersonal *apparebit*] multas bonas scripturas quae vulgo Stephano, Contio, aliis imputantur re vera huic librario deberi.' 'Stephanus' is obviously Henricus Stephanus, the editor and printer of the Paris edition of 1575. For 'Contius' we have to turn to the pre-

¹ Beriah Botfield's Prefaces to the *Editiones Principes*, p. 298. The inventory of Janus Lascaris' MSS, published by K. K. Müller in the *Centralblatt f. Bibl.* i (1884) 333 f., includes on p. 374 Δισχίνου λόγοι and Λυσίου ἀπολογία β, which Müller proposes to identify with Laur. lvii. 4 (=C), a corrected and interpolated transcript of the primary MS (X), whereas the Aldine text is mainly founded on the primary MS (or an exact transcript of it). Thus in 19 § 22 it has μὴς εἰπὼν κατεχρήσατο with X, whereas C has λαβὼν; in 14 § 14, φίλοι with X (ψιλοὶ C); 19 § 50, ἀπόντων with X (ἀπάντων C). Possibly therefore X, with which the Aldine generally agrees, was brought by Janus Lascaris from Mount Athos.

face of Auger's Paris edition of 1783, where we find (on p. xiii) that 'Antonius Contius' was a native of Nyon (on the Lake of Geneva); that he distinguished himself as a lawyer in Orleans and Bourges, where he died in 1586; that he entered in the margin of his copy of the Aldine text of 1513 a number of emendations and typographical memoranda which appeared to imply that he was meditating a text of his own, and that the volume (now in the Paris Library) was placed in Auger's hands by De Cissé, Bishop of Auxerre. It is not, however, certain that the emendations were made by Conti himself; like the *marginalia* in other copies of the Aldine text, they may have been transcribed from some other source (cp. Erdmann's *Lysiaca*, p. 4, n. 3). All these emendations were regarded as original, and were recorded by Auger at the end of his second volume. This is stated in a shorter form on p. viii of the preface to Thalheim's edition of 1901: (editionis Aldinae) 'ex exemplo . . . nunc Parisino Augerus in editione (Par. 1783) Antonii Contii emendationes deprompsit, qui natus Novioduni, doctissimus IC, Bituricae mortuus est 1586.' As there are many other persons of the name of Conti, and two or three of the name of Antonio Conti in *Nouvelle Biographie Générale*, where there is no notice of the critic of the text of Lysias, the bare mention of the name of Contius in Hude's preface is inadequate, and some further details are necessary. Again, in *Or.* 10 §§ 23, 28, Hude as well as Thalheim ascribes certain conjectures to 'Brulart,' but it is only from Thalheim's preface that we can readily learn that Brulart was a Bishop of Sillery, who died in 1714, and whose conjectures were entered in the margin of a copy of Stephanus' text now in the Paris Library.

An examination of the critical notes shows that more than ninety scholars have already contributed towards the correction of the text of Lysias. Six of these are justly mentioned with honour in the preface: Taylor, Markland, Reiske, Bekker, Dobree, Sauppe. Three of these belong to Cambridge: Jeremiah Markland of Peterhouse, John

Taylor of St. John's, and Peter Paul Dobree of Trinity. Markland's emendations were published in the editions of Taylor and Reiske, while Dobree's were posthumously printed in his *Adversaria*. One would gladly have seen the names of some editors of *Select Speeches*, such as Rauchenstein and Frohberger, and of the whole of Lysias, such as Cobet and Thalheim, duly recorded by the latest editor of the text. Cobet's interesting preface includes four pages of parallel columns setting forth the errors of the Palatine MS and the corrections of Cobet's predecessors, and thirteen comparing the readings of the MS with the great Dutch critic's own emendations. Thalheim, again, gives us four pages of bibliography, including the names and dates of previous editors, and an alphabetical list of fifty-three comparatively recent scholars, with references to the articles or dissertations in which they have dealt with the text. The page and a half remaining blank at the end of Hude's preface leaves room for some slight expansion in this direction in a future issue. Many English students will possess no other copy of the text than the present excellent edition, and, in their interest, as well as in justice to previous critics of the text, some such expansion is eminently desirable. Some notes and suggestions on the text may here be added:

Or. 2 (*Epitaphios*), §§ 24-28. In the critical notes Dr. Hude states that 'Aldus,' that is the *editio Aldina* of 1513, has ἐπήγγειλαν for ἀπήγγειλαν in § 26, and ἐξόν for ἐξόν γάρ in § 28. But neither of these variants can possibly be attributed to 'Aldus,' since the whole of the passage beginning with ἀποθανεῖν in § 24 and ending with Ἑλλησπόντον in § 28, in which these variants occur, is omitted in the printed text of the Aldine edition, which draws special attention to the *lacuna* by a blank containing the words λείπει πολύ, the amount omitted being about equivalent to a small octavo page of text. But, in a copy of that edition in the Leyden Library, the missing passage is supplied in *manuscript*, possibly (as has been suggested) by Paulus Manutius, with a view to a new edition of his father, Aldus Manutius' text of 1513. The above variants are in the *manuscript* addition to the Leyden copy, and ought to have been assigned, not to 'Aldus,' but to the *margo exempli Leidensis editionis Aldinae*, Dr. Hude's abbreviation for which is 'marg.-Ald.'

The evidence as to the *marginalia* in six

copies of the Aldine text has been partially collected with care in Erdmann's *Lysiae* (Strassburg, 1891). But, on the two copies in Cambridge, he quotes Taylor, at second hand, as quoted by Reiske: *exemplar alterum collegio D. Joannis . . . legavit . . . Matthaeus Prior; alterum in bibliotheca J. Mori episcopi Eliensis asservatur*. He conjectures that the latter personage was 'Joannes Morus, Prediger in York 1592, . . . Socius in Collegio Christi.' But John More, Fellow of Christ's, was not a preacher in York; he was known as the 'Apostle of Norwich,' and was never Bishop of Ely. The person in question was obviously John Moore, Fellow of Clare and Bishop of Ely (1714), whose celebrated library was bought by George I. and presented to the University of Cambridge. Taylor, who was University Librarian 1731-4, was perfectly familiar with this fact, and, indeed, at the end of the sentence correctly copied by Reiske, but incompletely quoted by Erdmann, actually adds: *Quam totam munificentia vere regia et liberalitate nunquam satis praedicanda Academiae Cantabrigiensis donavit Rex Optimus Georgius I. (Praefatio dated 1738, p. xxvi).*

Or. 7 (*de olea sacra*), § 1, οὕτως ἀπροσδοκῆτως αἰρίας καὶ πονηροῖς συκοφάνταις περιπέττωκα. Thalheim and Hude agree in rejecting Taylor's alteration of ἀπροσδοκῆτως into ἀπροσδοκῆτος, which, however, is accepted by Cobet. Taylor was in fact justified in expecting an adjective before αἰρίας as a necessary parallel to πονηροῖς before συκοφάνταις, but ἀπροσδοκῆτος is not a true parallel to πονηροῖς. Accordingly, I suggest that the missing adjective is αἰσχραῖς. Such a word might easily have dropped out, owing to its beginning and ending with the same syllables as the next word—αἰρίας. This suggestion is confirmed by § 41 of the same speech, where the same disgraceful charges are referred to in the phrase ἐπ' αἰσχίσταις αἰρίας, also by

Or. 6, § 44, ἐπ' αἰσχραῖς αἰρίας, Or. 10, § 26, οὕτως αἰσχρὰς αἰρίας (αἰσχρὰν αἰρίαν Reiske), Or. 16, § 12, δίκην αἰσχρὰν, Or. 21, § 18, αἰσχρὰς δίκας, and Deinarchus, Or. 1, § 93, περὶ αἰσχρὰς αἰρίας κοινῇ πάντες ἀγωνιζόμεθα. All these passages tend to support my proposal that the text should run: οὕτως ἀπροσδοκῆτως αἰσχραῖς αἰρίας καὶ πονηροῖς συκοφάνταις περιπέττωκα.

Or. 30 (*in Nicomachum*), § 6, ὑμᾶς τοῖνυν χρή, . . . ἐπειδὴ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου δίκην οὐκ εἰλήφατε, νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων γούν τὴν τιμωρίαν ποιήσασθαι. Here Hude regards γούν as *vix sanum*. Thalheim, on the other hand, endeavours to defend it by quoting Or. 25, § 4, ταῦτα γούν. But ταῦτα γούν presents no difficulty, because γούν ('at all events') there draws a contrast between a *part* and a preceding *whole*; as elsewhere, between *one* or a *few* and a preceding *all* or *many* (cp. 6, § 44, ἐν γούν, and 10, § 21, ἐγὼ γούν). The real difficulty lies in the contrast between πάντων and the preceding ἐνὸς ἐκάστου. It may, however, be suggested that, although, at first sight, πάντων γούν, 'all at any rate,' is apparently wrongly contrasted with the preceding ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, 'each single individual,' the real contrast is between condemning all at once and condemning several individuals *seriatim*. πάντων (= ἅμα πάντων) is stronger than πάντων, and is practically equivalent to ἀπαξ πάντων. Thus the *single* notion of the condemnation of all at one fell swoop is contrasted with the *series* of condemnations of the several persons previously mentioned; so that we here have a contrast between a single thing and a preceding plural, which is in accordance with the regular usage of γούν. No such attempt to defend the text would have been necessary, if we had found in the MSS νῦν γούν ὑπὲρ πάντων τὴν τιμωρίαν ποιήσασθαι.

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APOLLONIUS RHODIUS.

The Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius.

Edited with Introduction and Commentary by GEORGE W. MOONEY, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin. Pp. 454. Dublin University Press Series, 1912.

MR. MOONEY is justified in claiming the merit of freshness for his edition of the *Argonautica* with an English commentary, as the last edition by an Englishman was made nearly a century and a half ago. But Mr. Mooney has given us here an edition which, besides being fresh, is quite satisfactory and shows a thorough acquaintance with the principal work that has been done in this field up to the present time. The

literature is, as he remarks, very scattered and in many cases unprocurable, for Apollonius is a favourite subject for German dissertations. After all is said however, our ignorance of his life is so great that we know neither the date of his birth or death nor even whether he was, as tradition says, in the list of Librarians of the Alexandrian Library. The prevailing opinion among scholars now is that he was not. The tradition, as it appears in the anonymous *Lives* of Apollonius and in Suidas, is treated as of no account and rejected on chronological grounds. These grounds, if certain, must be conclusive, but they themselves rest on doubtful interpretations of passages in Callimachus and

other authors. Some scholars seem to regard a tradition that a certain event happened as equivalent to proof that it did not happen. The subject of the dates of Apollonius is too long to discuss here and Mr. Mooney is far removed from the dogmatic scepticism to which I have alluded. He just states the meagre facts we possess and leaves the question, and, after all, it makes no difference to our appreciation of the *Argonautica* whether its author was librarian or not. The Ritschelian hypothesis that Eratosthenes resigned the librarianship before his death and was succeeded by Apollonius, solves several difficulties and is not put out of court by the arbitrary statement of Couat, or, 'si quelque chose est certain dans l'histoire littéraire de l'école d'Alexandrie, c'est précisément ce fait que les bibliothécaires en titre gardaient leur charge toute leur vie.' At the same time Couat has given perhaps the best account of the tangled chronology of the Alexandrian writers, while Susemihl's is probably the worst. Much the same may be said of the famous quarrel between Apollonius and Callimachus. We know nothing of the circumstances, when it arose, or how long it lasted. The saying of Callimachus quoted in connexion with the quarrel, 'A great book is a great evil,' is supposed to refer to the *Argonautica*, but the Provost of King's College, Cambridge, regards it as an allusion to the experience of Callimachus as a librarian, and to nothing else. It is a natural remark for a librarian, but as it has been handed down as connected with the quarrel, may we not credit Callimachus with sufficient humour (not much is required) to have used the expression with a double meaning? It is obvious to any one who compares the concluding lines of the *Hymn to Apollo* with Apoll. Rhod. iii. 932 ff., that the two passages are related, but which is the earlier, and whether either of them is a later addition to its context, we do not know and probably never shall know. Many combinations, more or less plausible, have been proposed.

Mr. Mooney gives an interesting account, chiefly derived from the valuable scholia, of the sources from which

Apollonius drew, and some good criticism on the poem itself. There is one sentence however to which objection may be made. He says that by the portraiture of Medea 'called by fate to a new and strange destiny, made the instrument for the fulfilment of the purposes of gods and men, smitten by a love which her young heart cannot understand, though it obeys its impulses, we are moved in a way in which the widowed Dido with her mad infatuation, amid the hum and bustle of rising Carthage, moves us not.' I do not propose to discuss this, because the superiority of Virgil to Apollonius even in the love episode is *res iudicata*. Individual critics, no doubt, have their eccentricities, and, with all respect, I must regard the above judgment as an eccentricity of Mr. Mooney. There is nothing very tragic in the Medea of Apollonius. After a *début* of successful crime we leave her on the threshold of what promises to be a prosperous career in Thessaly.

The text of the present edition, as Mr. Mooney says (I will call him M. to save space), is to a large extent the same as my own in the Oxford Classical Series, hence I cannot be expected to criticise it severely. Since the Oxford text was published (1900), vol. iv. of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri (1904) confirms Porson's conjecture *ναυτίλοι* in III. 745 for *ναῦται* of codd.: *accedat textus*. *Ναῦται* is suspect because of the lengthening of the last syllable before a vowel without a pause in the sense. Also in I. 372 Bergk's *πρώειραν ἔσω* is confirmed, as Prof. Fitch has pointed out (*Amer. Journ. Phil.* No. 121), by a quotation of the line in Etymologicum Genuinum—a name given by Reitzenstein to an earlier form of the Etymologicum Magnum. The best codd. have *πρώραν ἔσω*. The usual reading is *πρώραν εἶσω* or *ἔσσω*. M. offers very few conjectures of his own. In I. 517 for the corrupt *ἡ θέμις ἐστὶ τέως ἐπὶ τε γλώσσησι χέοντο* he ingeniously reads *ἡ θέμις ἐστηώτες ἐπὶ γλ. χ.* In I. 987 codd. have *ἐκ δ' ἄρα τοίγε | νῆα Χυτοῦ λιμένος προτέρου ἐξήλασαν ὄρμον* which Merkel has corrected by *Χυτὸν λιμένα*. M. conjectures *νῆα Χυτοῦ λιμένος προτέρω ἐξήλασαν ὄρμον*, 'to the mooring-place of the harbour called Chytus,' which I

do not consider to be as good as Merkel's, *προτέρου ὅρου* referring back to *Καλὸς λιμήν* of 954. In II. 160, where *codd.* have *ἀγχιάλω, τῇ καὶ τῇ περὶ πρυμνήσι' ἀνῆπτο*, M. conjectures *ἀγχι, τῇ ἀκτῇ ἐπι, πρ. ἀν.* Merkel's *τῇ καὶ τε περὶ πρ. ἀν.* is simpler, *περὶ* being taken adverbially.

IV. 1646.

ὑπαὶ δέ οἱ ἔσκε τένοντος
σύργε αἱματόεσσα κατὰ σφυρόν' αὐτὰρ
ὁ τήνγε
λεπτὸς ὑμήν, ζωῆς, ἔχε, πείρατα καὶ
θανάτοιο.

M. reads *ὁ τ' ἦρχε* for *ὁ τήνγε*, translating, 'the thin membrane, which compressed this, controlled the issues of life and death.' He adds the comment, 'The reading of the MSS. is certainly corrupt, as it involves governing *τήνγε* by *ἔχε*, taking *πείρατα* in app. with *ὑμήν*, while *ὁ* is meaningless. Brunck's *ὁ τῆς γε . . . ὑμήν* is not epic.' But I would reply (1) *ὁ τ' ἦρχε* is not epic, inasmuch as the article when used as a relative does not precede the antecedent, see Monro *H. G.* § 262; (2) *ὁ* is not 'meaningless' as it anticipates *λεπτὸς ὑμήν*, and this anticipatory use is common in epic, *H. G.* § 258; (3) I do not take *πείρατα* in apposition with *ὑμήν* but with *τήνγε*. The sentence is awkward certainly, but if a conjecture is necessary I prefer Brunck's *τῆς γε*, though not epic, to M.'s.

The commentary is just what is wanted for university students. Concise and lucid, it gives enough assistance without withdrawing the necessity for independent thought. I will devote the rest of my space to a few remarks upon passages where I find reason to differ from the editor's views, but I do so in some cases with hesitation and in all with respect.

The *Argonautica* begins with an invocation to Apollo which occupies four lines. Then the narrative begins *Τοῖν γὰρ Πελίης κ.τ.λ.* In l. 8 all the MSS. (except one inferior one which has *τοῖν*) have *δηρὸν δ' οὐ μετέπειτα τῆν κατὰ βᾶξιν Ἰήσων*. All modern scholars have objected to *τῆν* and propose various emendations, *θεήν, αὐτήν, ἐτήν*. The last, which is Merkel's, is perhaps the

least unsatisfactory. M., however, in agreement with Samuelsson (*Ad. Apoll. Rhod. Adversaria*, p. 3) defends *τῆν* on the ground that 'the poet is anxious to show the intimate connexion of Apollo with the expedition, and his responsibility therefor.' But neither of them meets the real objection to *τῆν* which is, that it is not in accordance with epic convention that, after the invocation, reference should be made to it, and it is improbable that Apollonius would violate this convention. These invocations, as is well known, were often detachable and could be fitted on as required. We finish with the invocation of Apollo at l. 4. What Mr. Mooney has not done, and what he has to do, is to parallel this reference to the invocation in the narrative. Scholars have felt this to be the difficulty, and if *τῆν* had been defensible some one would have attempted the defence long before now. In I. 103 M. in common with editors since Brunck reads *κοινήν ὁδόν* which has very slight MS. authority. Hart (1863) emended to *κείνην* which is the reading of the first hand in *Guelph. Laur.* has *κεινήν*. I do not hesitate to accept *κείνην* as correct. The fatal objection to *κοινήν* is the form. It would be *ξυνήν*. I. 269, *ὡς ἔχετο κλαίουσ' ἀδινώτερον, ἥτε κούρη . . . μύρεται*. M. is doubtful whether *ἥτε* means 'as' or 'than.' Whatever be the meaning in *Il.* IV. 277, *μελάντερον ἥτε πίσσα*, I think that here *ἥτε* means 'as' because of *μύρεται* and so Leaf (*ad Il.* l. c.) takes it. With the meaning 'than' we should have no finite verb following. I. 934, *διάνδιχα νηὸς ἰούσης*. I am now of opinion that de Mirmont is right in his interpretation, viz. that *διάνδιχα* refers to the shifting of the sail from one side to the other to catch the wind, and is illustrated by Catullus iv. 19-21 and Virgil, *Aen.* v. 831. In I. 1216 *ἀνῆ* with *ῖ* is, I think, indefensible. Merkel's *ἄτη* improves the sense as well as the metre. II. 590, *ὅσσον δ' ἂν ὑπείκαθε νηὸς ἐρέτησιν, | δις τόσον ἀψ' ἀπόρουσεν*. M. defends *ἂν* as iterative, but iterative *ἂν* is only found with the apodosis. Herwerden's *ἄρ'* is perhaps the best correction. II. 1179, *οὐδὲ μὲν ἄνδρες | λήθομεν ἐμπεδον, οἳ τε θεοудέες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι*. M. translates 'who are god-fearing and unjust,' which

is a contradiction. How can the same people be both *θεουδέες* and *οὐ δίκαιοι*? We should expect a reference to two classes, but the Greek will not permit of this. The Homeric *ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι* is not parallel in sense, for there the same people are referred to. M. adds, 'the conjecture *ἡδέ* for *οὐδέ* is easy but bad.' Possibly, but some emendation is called for. On III. 26, *ὁτρύνομεν* (aor. subj.) M. remarks: 'The only example in Apollonius of a subjunctive with short vowel from a non-sigmatic aorist. There is one in Hom. also, *ἐπεντύνονται*, *Od.* 24, 89.' There is some confusion here. In Homer, as is well known, the short vowel is peculiar to the subjunctive of non-thematic tenses, not merely to the subjunctive of the sigmatic aorist. Thus *ὁτρύνομεν* (aor. subj.) occurs three times in Homer, being the subjunctive of *ὠτρυνάω* and therefore non-thematic. As an aorist subjunctive form *ἐπεντύνονται* is quite regular; the difficulty is that in *l. c.* we have a subjunctive referring to past time, which is non-Homeric. III. 91, *πίθοιτό κεν ὕμμι μάλιστα, ἢ ἐμοί*. M. might have illustrated *μάλιστα ἢ* from *Oxyg. Pap.* Vol. VII., No. 1015, where we find in a panegyric poem τῷ σ' ἐπὶ τοῖσι μάλιστα γεραίρομεν ἢ περ ἐκείνοις. III. 321, *ὑπὸ δούρασι πεπτηῶτας*. M. takes Madvig's emendation *ἐπὶ* and translates 'having fallen on some timbers;' but surely this is unnecessary, for *ὑπὸ* can be taken by tmesis with *πεπτηῶτας* (*πτήσσω*), 'crouching on the beams.'

III. 641.

ἔμπα γε μὴν θεμένη κύνεον κέαρ, οὐκέτ' ἀνευθεν
αὐτοκασινγήτης πειρήσομαι, εἴ κέ μ' ἀέθλω
χραιοσμεῖν ἀντιάσῃσιν, ἐπὶ σφετέροις
ἀχέουσα
παισί· τό κιν μοι λυγρὸν ἐνὶ κραδίῳ
σβέσαι ἄλγος.

This is a difficult passage, but I think M. in his rendering mistakes the sense. He translates, 'nevertheless, though I have banished shame from my heart, I will not yet essay aught without my sister, if haply she entreat me to aid them in their task through anguish for her sons,' etc. (1) *οὐκέτι* is translated

as if it were *οὐπω*, (2) *θεμένη* is not concessive but rather causal in sense, (3) *εἴ* is not conditional but introduces an object clause after *πειρήσομαι*. I take *οὐκέτ' ἀνευθεν* as = *οὐκέτ' ἀνευθεν οὔσα* and translate (as in fact it stands in my translation): 'Yet, taking to myself a reckless heart, I will no more keep aloof but will make trial of my sister to see if she will entreat me to aid in the contest, through grief for her own sons,' etc. III. 1383, *τοὺς δε καὶ ἄχρις ὥμων τελλομένους*. On *ὥμων* M. remarks: 'this word has been suspected, but it is defended by the fact that Val. Fl. (7, 619) mentions those whose heads only were above the ground, 'necdum *humeri* videre diem.' M. does not meet the difficulty. The suspicion attaching to *ὥμων* is not to the word itself but to its position. Apollonius mentions (1) those earth-born men who had risen halfway out of the ground, (2) those who were out as far as the shoulders, (3) those who had completely risen. We should expect the order to be (2) (1) (3). To meet this abnormal gradation *γούνων* and *κώλων* have been suggested. But I think the difficulty is much mitigated, if not abolished, if the words *τοὺς . . . τελλομένους* are taken parenthetically. M. defends III. 1393 *οἱ μὲν ὁδᾶξ τετρηχότα βῶλον ὁδοῦσιν | λαζόμενοι πρηνεῖς*, by the remark, 'the pleonasm is merely apparent, as *ὁδᾶξ* and *ὁδοῦς* are probably from different roots.' That may be so, still it seems to me intolerable. Hermann suggests *ἀρούρης* which he thinks was displaced by *ὁδοῦσιν* a gloss on *ὁδᾶξ*. I think this quite possible in spite of the somewhat arbitrary statement of M. 'such a familiar word would not require a gloss.'

IV. 501.

ῥηιδίῃ δέ κεν ἄμμι, κεδασθέντων δίχα
λαῶν,
ἥδ' εἴη μετέπειτα κατερχομένοισι κέλευθος.

M. adopts Merkel's conjecture of *ἦ τ'* for *ἥδ'*, but whatever objection may be made to *ἥδ'* there is far greater objection to *ἦ τ'*, for it involves (1) the separation of *κεν* from *εἴη* by *ἦ* which seems impossible, (2) taking *κατερχο-*

μένουσι apart from ἄμμι and without any construction—at least I suppose that as M. adopts Merkel's conjecture he also adopts his explanation.

There are two useful appendices, first, on the double recension of the *Argonautica* about which our information is very defective, and, second, on the metre.

The edition might have been made still more complete by some disquisition upon the grammar of Apollonius, but it seems ungracious to ask for more when we are given so much that is valuable.

R. C. SEATON.

KRAMER'S VALERIUS FLACCUS.

C. Valeri Flacci Setini Balbi Argonauticon Libri Octo. Edidit OTTO KRAMER. 1 vol. Pp. lxxxvi + 218. Leipzig: Teubner, 1913. M. 3.20; bound M. 3.60.

AN unkind star seems to watch over the Teubner editions of Valerius Flaccus. That of 1875 was simply a re-writing of the *Argonautica* by Baehrens, and Kramer's, which would otherwise have been worthy of the great series in which it appears, is spoiled by a very serious error of judgment. If we take the fifty to sixty scholars who have handled the poem since, say, the appearance of the Juntine and Aldine editions, and reckon up the number of times the conjectures of each are admitted to the text of this edition, we find that, after Heinsius, whose total is between 70 and 80, only three critics reach double figures. One of them is Burmann, with 16 successes; another, Gronov, with 12; the third is Sigfrid Sudhaus, and his score is 43. Of these emendations I reckon three good enough for their position (IV. 426 *quem sors*, V. 269 *ipsumque ut*, VIII. 62 *me patiens*), five worth mention in the apparatus (II. 103, 136, III. 575, 622, VI. 696), twenty-one possible but superfluous, as being at any rate in no way superior to the MS. reading or the Vulgate, and fourteen frankly impossible.

A few examples will, I think, justify the stress I am laying on this unfortunate feature of an otherwise excellent book. In I. 491 *V* reads 'compressus pectore tigris,' which is certainly puzzling: K. has, from Sudhaus, *compressans*. In II. 439 Valerius tells us how the Samothracian priest initiates the Argonauts in the local mysteries, and then, suddenly checking himself, says

'hactenus in populos uati Samothraca diemque | missa mane,' as is generally read, with no very violent change from

V's 'uates amothraca dicam.'¹ Kramer does not mention the Vulgate, and reads 'h. in p. uates, Samothracia, dicam: | missa mane.' Anything worse than this conjecture of Sudhaus, with its absolute 'dicam in populos,' feeble 'uates,' abrupt and meaningless 'missa mane,' I can hardly imagine, and the fact that a perfectly unobjectionable correction already existed makes it worse. The extraordinary thing is that the apparatus reveals the fact that Sudhaus himself offered it 'dubitanter'! In VI. 152 we are told of a nation of wizards: 'omnibus in superos saeuus (h)onor.' Metre and sense are certainly unsatisfactory. Sudhaus' *sonor* gets rid of one difficulty, but what does it mean? We are referred to *magico sono* in VII. 389, but my difficulty is not in understanding what a *saeuus sonor* is—the twentieth century knows that only too well—but in connecting the phrase with *in superos*. Perhaps the most lamentable specimen of all is to be found at VI. 553, where we read how Argus brings down two horsemen: *utrumque ab equis ingenti porrigit auso*, as K. prints it, taking presumably *porrigit* in the sense of *sternit*, for which I know no parallel. It is true that *V*'s *auro* makes no sense either, but the obvious and necessary *aruo* appeared in the Juntine edition some four hundred years ago. This reading is not even mentioned in the apparatus: its correctness may be seen by comparing not

¹ *V* continually omits *que*, e.g. four times in Bk. I. *Missa in diem* is of course equivalent to *in lucem producta*.

only the Homer and Vergil passages cited by Langen, but Liv. X. 10. 10 'in spatium ingens ruentem porrigit hostem.'

Elsewhere, where his old teacher's conjectures are not concerned, Kramer shows sound judgment, distinguishing with marked success between the emendation that deserves a place in the text, that which should be mentioned, and that which should be ignored. Only in this last category do I think he has been a little too severe: apart from the cases quoted above, I have noted sixteen conjectures in the first four books with which the hastiest reader of Valerius can hardly dispense.¹ K.'s own positive contributions to the text are not very convincing, though *faxo* for *fas* in V. 670 is worth consideration and his rejection of *C* at VII. 373 and discovery of

oscula miscet in *V*'s mysterious *quâ* extremely ingenious and probable.² But his use of a remedy which I believe to be the only cure for many desperate passages of ancient authors, the assumption of a lacuna, is most happy, nowhere more so than at VII. 186, where he has quite convinced me that *V*'s *amplexumque petit* is sound and refers to Juno's reception of Venus' offer, some such line as 'talìa iactantem blandis Saturnia dictis' having fallen out before it.

The Introduction, a model of clearness and Latinity, deals wholly with textual matters. First, with the Vatican MS., which K. has himself examined. Here he discusses at length the passages in which he assumes the existence of lacunae, shows that Kennerknecht's transposition at I. 403 sqq. is

¹ E.g. I. 59 *cautis* (Lochbach), 68 *currus et quos . . . creditur* (Baehrens), II. 111 *his* (Baehrens), 431 *crescit* (Hosius: how can *transit* be used of an island on which the heroes land?), 464 *fletus* (reading of *S*), III. 193 *hinc* (Langen), 223 *aestus, animos, actus, flatus* (various scholars), 273 transposition of the line to follow 310 (Hartel), 513 *pulso* (Columbus), 540 *moueret* (Pius).

² I cannot however accept his reconstruction of the line: 'dat dextram blandisque pauens Venus oscula miscet (adloquii)'; all that K. urges on behalf of *pauens* on p. lxxi is useless: Venus is not afraid until l. 394 'iamque tremens longe aequitur Venus.'

needless (there are 42 oarsmen, and the 21 on Hercules' side of the ship are enumerated first), and gives an account of *V*'s fifteenth-century copies. Passing next to the lost St. Gall MS. he declares it be a direct copy of *V*, and gives some interesting descriptions of certain peculiarities in *V*'s script or condition which he thinks misled the scribe of *S*: e.g. *V* at II. 376 reads *segni*, but the writing on the other side of the page shows through and makes it look so like *segnis* that one collator has actually recorded this to be its reading. And *segnis* is the reading of *S*. The Paris excerpts are dismissed as having no independent value and then the rest of the Introduction—nearly one half of the whole—is concerned with the famous 'tenth century' MS. of Carrio. That scholar's good faith is vigorously maintained, but K. doubts his power to date his MS. accurately at the age of 18, and believes it to belong to the fifteenth-century interpolated class. He argues that in several passages where *C*'s reading is generally preferred to *V*'s, the latter is really right, proving his case, to my mind at all events, as regards II. 294, 599; IV. 572; V. 134; VII. 478, 630. Finally, producing 9 instances of *C*'s superiority to *S* as the only ones on which *C*'s advocates lay stress, he tries to show that these readings are due to learned conjecture, five of them demonstrably the fruit of the study of Vergil and Statius. I think the ground is very doubtful here. Valerius was one of Vergil's imitators, and the fact that *C*'s reading recalls Vergil is surely as much for the genuineness as against it. Resemblance to Statius I think a distinct point for genuineness. We know, and K. himself admits on p. lxxi, that Statius did use Valerius: I feel very sceptical as to the probability of a fifteenth-century editor's using Statius. K. himself finds only one instance of 'Statius-interpolation' among *C*'s good readings, and I don't think that even in this the resemblance to Statius, which consists in the juxtaposition by means of double *que* of the words *pontus* and *polus* at the end of the line, is strong enough to serve as foundation of any kind of theory. In the four instances un-

earthed from C's bad readings the resemblance to Statius seem to me absolutely accidental. There remains only the consideration of an excellent¹ line with which C fills an indisputable gap of V's in the simile of IV. 195 sqq. K. thinks it is concocted from a line in an almost identical simile found in Statius (*Theb.* VII. 436 sqq.). I must say that in view of the fact that Statius' use of Valerius is certain I think there can be little doubt that we have an example of it in his employ-

¹ K. attacks the line on its merits, but I do not find the *collocatio* particularly *dura*, and decidedly think the language more forcible than that of the line he himself has composed in its stead.

ment of this simile, and it would seem more natural to explain that somehow or other C has really preserved the line of Valerius which inspired l. 439 in Statius. Not that I reject K.'s general attitude towards C: there is no denying that its good readings help us but little: we feel that we could have guessed most of them for ourselves, and any tender feelings they may have excited are choked by the suspicions which the bad ones arouse. But it is no use to close our eyes to certain difficulties about the position, which Kramer cannot be said to have removed.

WALTER C. SUMMERS.

Sheffield.

SHORT NOTICES

GREEK ART AND NATIONAL LIFE.

Greek Art and National Life. By S. C. KAINES SMITH. 9" x 5½". Pp. xiv + 376, with seven photogravures and many other illustrations. London: Nisbet and Co., 1913. Cloth, 7s. 6d. net.

MANY will be grateful to Mr. Smith for this enthusiastic account of Greek art and life; others will wish for less of his rather tiring enthusiasm and more opportunity for quiet contemplation of the Greek things themselves. It must, in justice, be admitted that in his preface Mr. Smith claims to be only a 'missionary' and not a 'theologian' in Greek things. Our quarrel with him is that he is too good for this. We should like to have seen him leave to his Extension lectures his rhetorical descriptions of the Sack of Knossos (he seems to know all about it!), of the arrival of Pheidipides with the news of the victory of Marathon, of the battle of Salamis and of the Panathenaic festival, and confine himself to the development of the theme, implied in the title, of a parallelism between the course of history and that of Greek sculpture. It is a good theme well traced out, in spite of occasional

crudities in some of the isolated examples given. Perhaps Mr. Smith will some day give us a more scholarly book—a task of which he is well capable—on these lines, when he will, of course, not omit to give references to the literary authorities—an omission which is rather to be regretted even in a popular work.

Even when we take Mr. Smith at his own valuation we are inclined to think that he writes down to his audience a little too much. Surely even a popular audience can be induced to take an interest in that well-known series of draped Acropolis figures without having them referred to as 'the Aunts'? Otherwise the book is distinctly good; the illustrations are excellent—to say nothing of the seven photogravures. There are some very good conceptions well worked out, as in the interpretation of the labours of Heracles as the work of a new and energetic people, and in the account of the *raison d'être* of the different members of a regular Doric temple. Throughout the book the simple *ὄτι* is traced down to its *δι' ὅτι* whenever possible in natural laws. But occasionally Mr. Smith's desire to work out a pre-conception leads him astray, as when he inclines to accept Paionios and Alkamenos, on the authority of

Pausanias, as the sculptors of the pediments of the Temple of Zeus at Olympia in face of the great discrepancy between that work and what we otherwise know of these sculptors, simply because 'Paionios came from a land of painters' and paint was obviously relied upon in these pediments!

We note two misprints—Plontos on p. xiii and γανῶσις for γάνωσις on p. 181.

R. B. APPLETON.

Lyndewode House, Cambridge.

Aristarchus of Samos. By Sir T. L. HEATH, K.C.B., F.R.S. pp. vi. 425. Clarendon Press, 1913. 18s.

ARISTARCHUS of Samos was an astronomer and mathematician, who may be dated approximately 310-230 B.C. The only work of his now extant is a little treatise on the *Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon*, which appears to have been written early in his career, for it is founded on false hypotheses, which he seems to have afterwards corrected. It consists of eighteen propositions, treated in the Euclidean manner, though a figure is not always necessary. *Prop. 9* is a fair specimen: 'The diameter (*i.e.* the real diameter) of the sun is greater than eighteen times, but less than twenty times, the diameter of the moon.' Sir Thomas Heath has edited the Greek text, translated it and furnished it with notes in the magnificent style with which his editions of Archimedes, Diophantus and other Greek mathematicians have now made us familiar. He does not, however, pretend that this treatise of Aristarchus, though interesting to the mathematician, is of any astronomical importance, since, as above stated, it is founded on two false postulates, viz.: that the apparent (not the real) diameters of the sun and moon are always the same with themselves and with one another, and that the apparent diameter of the moon is 2° , a very gross exaggeration. (Archimedes, at a later date, attributes to Aristarchus the discovery that the apparent diameter of the moon is only

$\frac{1}{2}^\circ$.) But though the treatise is not important, Aristarchus is, for he appears to have been the first propounder of the heliocentric theory of the universe, now attributed to Copernicus. This is the matter which chiefly interests Sir Thomas Heath, and has caused him to investigate the whole history of Greek astronomy down to Aristarchus' time. Two-thirds of the book are occupied with this history, and of these two-thirds, a very large portion is devoted to Plato (56 pp.) and Aristotle (32 pp.) Students of the *Timaeus* and the *De Caelo* must not miss our author's careful and original discussion of the various theories and fancies put forward in these works, and of the explanations of them given by the commentators. On the whole, neither Plato nor Aristotle appears to have made any valuable contribution to astronomical science. The salient points in the history of astronomical theory before Hipparchus are that the Pythagoreans, or Pythagoras himself, discovered that the earth was spherical, and suggested that it revolved round a central fire (not the sun): that Heracleides Ponticus, about 350 B.C., discovered that Venus and Mercury revolved round the sun, and that the earth rotates on its axis, and that Aristarchus suggested that the earth and other planets revolved round the sun (of course in *circular* orbits). The rest of the history is a maze of guesses and isolated observations leading up to, or away from, these bits of solid knowledge. To the student of Greek literature, other than philosophical, Sir T. Heath has not much to say. The astronomy of the farmer and the sailor and the *ἱερομνήμων*, which is also the astronomy of the poet and the historian, is not his topic, and he alludes to it only incidentally. He is concerned with theories of the universe, and of these, within his period, he has given by far the fullest account that has yet appeared in any language. The book is not easy reading, but it is at least as easy as it can be made, and there is some stimulus to the energies in the thought that this is the recreation of a man who, in his working hours, is engaged in great affairs.

J. Gow.

Aperçu d'une histoire de la langue grecque.

Par A. MEILLET. Paris: Hachette et Cie., 1913. Cm. 19×12. 1 vol. Pp. xvi+368. Fr. 3.50.

THE work of many scholars carried out during the last thirty years has enabled us to appreciate the development which Greek has made through a long period of time, almost, one might say, from the days of Indo-germanic unity to the present day. This seems somewhat of an exaggeration—for we have no monuments of Greek before the Homeric poems, and there is a great gap in our knowledge of the spoken language between the days of the Byzantine Empire and to-day; but the main lines of development are well established from comparison with other Indo-germanic languages, from the monuments, and from our knowledge of the principles of language in general. M. Meillet's object has been to show, by means of a striking example, how complex has been the development of the Indo-germanic languages, and how greatly outside forces affect the evolution of speech.

The great contribution of the new French school of philologists has been to keep us vividly in touch with the realities of language; and M. Meillet, as the foremost representative of this school, has in this book brilliantly maintained its reputation. In it he shows how the development of Greek has depended on historical events and on social conditions; and how the forces of disintegration and of unification have been at work throughout the whole history of the language.

The book is divided into three sections. The first of these deals with the affinities of Greek to the other Indo-germanic languages, and its subsequent separation into dialect groups. The chapters which treat of the dialects are particularly illuminating, written as they are with all the author's well-known lucidity of thought and expression. In the second section he describes the growth of literary languages, dealing at some length with the languages of the epic, of the lyric, of tragedy, of the Ionic and Attic prose-writers, and of the comedy. This is undoubtedly the most

original contribution of the book, when considered apart from the originality of the main idea. In the last section the author describes the unification of Greek into the *κοινή*, with its origin and characteristics, and its subsequent splitting a second time into local dialects; and he ends with a short account of the growth of a new *κοινή* fostered in the schools, the scientific books, and above all in the newspapers of modern Athens.

This is a work which should be read by all who are interested in Greek, whether or not they are professed students of Comparative Philology. As so often with French books, it is well printed on bad paper (on the other hand it is very cheap); and it contains no index. At the beginning there is a full and well-chosen bibliography.

R. L. TURNER.

Dikaionmata: Auszüge aus Alexandrinischen Gesetzen und Verordnungen in einem Papyrus des philologischen Seminars der Universität Halle, von der Graeca Halensis. 4to. Pp. x+252; 9 plates. Berlin: Weidmann, 1913.

OF the multifarious non-literary documents recovered in recent years from Egypt few approach in interest and importance the papyrus which provides the title of the volume lately issued by the Greek Society of Halle. This remarkable text, which extends to eleven columns, for the most part sufficiently well preserved for satisfactory reconstruction, was written in the middle of the third century B.C., and contains a series of Alexandrian laws and ordinances upon a variety of subjects—testimony, personal violence, taking of oaths, observance of boundaries, purchase of real property, mortgage, and the like. The miscellaneous character of these regulations is plausibly explained by the editors' suggestion that they were put together in some advocate's office for professional use in the courts. In any case they offer material of great value for the student of Greek law and procedure. One noteworthy feature is their individuality. In the third century B.C., especially in a new

foundation like Alexandria, a much closer correspondence with Athenian institutions might naturally have been expected than what is actually found here. Appended to this are a few other Halle papyri, literary and documentary, the chief among the former being a fragment giving the ends of eleven lines which are attributed with much probability to Sappho. The editors have strangely failed to understand the diacritical signs accompanying this text, which are, as usual, marks of quantity, elision, accent, etc., and have nothing to do with musical notation. There are, further, a mutilated epic fragment in which a reference occurs to Hesiod, a scrap of Homer μ , of the (earlier?) Ptolemaic period, showing a divergence from the vulgate at l. 346, some fragments of Aeschines *c. Timarchum*, possessing some critical significance, and other minor pieces. Of the documents, which are all of the third century B.C., not more than two or three are in fair preservation, and these are of comparatively small compass. The volume is admirably produced (Wilcken, though no longer at Halle, is among the editors), and is provided with nine excellent facsimiles and full indices.

A. S. H.

Papyrus de Magdola. Seconde Édition. Par J. LESQUIER. (Papyrus grecs de Lille. Tome II., fasc. ii-iv.) Paris: Leroux, 1912.

THIS is a welcome re-edition of an interesting group of petitions dating from the close of the third century B.C., first published by MM. Jouguet and Lefebvre in the *Bulletin de Correspondence hellénique* in 1902-3. Since then a number of contributions towards the emendation and interpretation of the documents have been made by various scholars, especially by Wilcken, who paid a short visit to Lille in 1904. In the present handsome volume, which includes translations, commentaries and indices, and is accompanied by an envelope of facsimiles, M. Lesquier embodies the results of recent criticism and makes further improvements of his own. It was unfortunate that he failed to observe what is now pointed out

by E. von Druffel in *Philologus* lxxi., pp. 272 ff., that nos. 6 and 38 are parts of the same document.

A. S. H.

Marius the Epicurean, by WALTER PATER, 2 vols. London: Philip Lee Warner, publishers to the Medici Society, 1913. 30s. net.

THIS is the first English book in Medici type which I have handled: I read a good part of it through to get the impression of the type for English, and it proves to be thoroughly legible, and restful to the eye. This is to my mind the most important virtue in type, although designers of modern 'art-types,' including William Morris, seem to be of a very different opinion, and to regard the page as a kind of wall paper with a pattern upon it. Having satisfied myself that this type is legible, I can now examine its shape. Here two points call for remark. The dash is hardly longer than a hyphen—which cannot be thought wise; and the Greek type used for quotations is both ugly and illegible. Yet what a Greek type might be made! Apart from these points, the printing must be admitted to be a real success.

W. H. D. R.

A CATALOGUE OF THE SCULPTURES OF THE MUSEO CAPITOLINO.

A Catalogue of the Sculptures of the Museo Capitolino. By Members of the British School at Rome. Edited by H. STUART JONES, M.A. 1 Vol. and Portfolio of Plates. Text 8vo., Plates 4to. Pp. v + 418, 93 Plates. Oxford: Clarendon Press, November 21, 1912. £3 3s.

DR. AMELUNG's catalogue of the Vatican sculptures may be said to have begun a new era in the cataloguing of antiques. Not only did the descriptions and comments give the maximum of information in the minimum of space, but the complete series of plates made it altogether more useful than any catalogue that had up to that time appeared. To the young student, whose knowledge of bibliography is not extensive, it is

of inestimable use to have a compact series of illustrations, which, together with the text, will in many cases set him on the right track of things, which otherwise he would have found only with difficulty; and the book is of no less use to the researcher whose means of making comparisons and quickly verifying points will be rendered very much more easy.

The present volumes were suggested by Dr. Amelung's work and carry it forward. They are the first instalment of a complete catalogue of the sculptures preserved in the municipal collections at Rome. Mr. Stuart Jones, while Director of the British School at Rome, projected the scheme and obtained the sanction of the authorities. The work was undertaken by the British School as a whole, and the chief contributors are Professor P. Gardner, Mr. Wace, Mr. Yeames, Mr. and Mrs. Daniel, and Mrs. Strong. Dr. Ashby helped with questions of *provenance*, while the Editor, besides supervising and revising the whole, described the Greek portraits.

The present catalogue fully maintains the high standard set by Dr. Amelung. The descriptions of the individual pieces of sculpture are detailed enough to be interesting, but stop short of lengthiness. The chief theories held about the better known works are stated sufficiently but succinctly, while references to replicas and parallels will be found most helpful. Expert opinion has made the statements as to the variety of marble used particularly trustworthy. A test of the thoroughness of the work is to be had in the way in which questions of *provenance* have been gone into. This work, which is always of a laborious description, was rendered particularly so by the absence of any official inventory of the Capitoline Collection. The introduction gives a history of the various phases of the collection, while there are appended to the catalogue such inventories of parts of the collection—notably of the Albani Collection—as are extant. The plates, which are collotypes and show reproductions of every work of our catalogue, are exceedingly clear and compare favourably with those of the Vatican cata-

logue. In testing some of the references only one slip was found. The two catalogues which are to complete the plan undertaken by the British School at Rome are to be those of the Palazzo dei Conservatori and of the Magazzino Archeologico on the Caelian. All archaeologists owe a great debt of gratitude to Mr. Stuart Jones and his colleagues for the work they have done.

It is to be hoped that in the future it will become the rule instead of being the exception for museums to be catalogued in the way in which the Vatican has been catalogued, and the Municipal Collections at Rome and the vases in the Munich Antiquarium are in process of being catalogued.

E. M. W. T.

The Cults of Ostia. By LILY ROSS TAYLOR. (Bryn Mawr College Monographs, Vol. XI.). Bryn Mawr, Pa.: published by Bryn Mawr College, 1912. 8vo. 1 vol. Pp. 98. \$1.00 net.

MISS TAYLOR's monograph is an extremely careful and thorough piece of work, and the religious history of Ostia presents so many points of interest that the collection of the evidence for its various cults was worth the trouble taken. The earliest and perhaps, from an official point of view, the most important of these worshipings was that of Volcanus, in connexion with which we meet with the remarkable titles of *pontifex Volcani et aedium sacrarum, praetor and aedilissacris Volcani faciundis*. Wissowa's view that the god of fire was worshipped at Ostia on account of the dangers to which its granaries were exposed, has little to commend it, since the cult dates from a period when Rome had not learnt to depend on foreign corn; and we can only suppose that from remote antiquity Volcanus had been to Ostia what Diana was to Aricia or Juno Sospita to Lanuvium. Miss Taylor suggests that the worship of the fire-god belonged to a village which was merged in the Roman colony of Ostia, founded—as recent inquiry and the negative results of excavation seem to show—about the end of the fourth or beginning

of the third century B.C. This does not seem likely, as if such a *pagus* or *vicus* existed, it was not on the site of the colony, nor is *praetor* a title for which parallels can be found.

It is well known that Ostia has furnished abundant evidence of the spread of Oriental cults in the West during the first three centuries of the Empire, and especially of Mithraism. Miss Taylor notes that as compared with Puteoli the worship of Syrian and Phoenician gods was relatively uncommon at Ostia, while the cults of Magna Mater and Mithras, which flourished there, were probably not directly introduced from the East. The conclusion that the presence of foreign traders is not reflected in the religious institutions of Ostia is not, however, to be pressed. The prevalence of Isis-worship, and more especially the presence of a *Sarapeum* at Portus, points to a close connexion with Alexandria.

By a curious slip '44 B.C.' is twice printed for '44 A.D.' on p. 14.

H. STUART JONES.

The Topography and Monuments of Ancient Rome. By SAMUEL BALL PLATNER, Western Reserve University. 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. 8 maps and plans, 93 illustrations in text. 8vo. 1 vol. Pp. xiv+538. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1911. \$3.

ALTHOUGH somewhat belated, this notice may serve to draw the attention of some who are in search of a handy manual of Roman topography to the revised edition of Mr. S. B. Platner's book, which follows the original issue after an interval of seven years, during which excavations in Rome, though not so startling in their results as those of the preceding period, have brought to light some important remains, whilst the study of those previously discovered has made continuous and fruitful progress. The scope of Mr. Platner's work prevents him from giving a full discussion of the very difficult problems which have been raised in recent years—such, for example, as those which concern the position of the temple of Apollo on the Palatine, or the various transformations of the Rostra; but the reader may be

sure of finding the opposing views which contend for the acceptance of archaeologists fairly stated, and—what is equally important—accompanied by bibliographical references, which will enable him to go to the original sources if he wishes to make a more profound study. Mr. Platner prides himself justly on the great increase in the number of references supplied in the new edition; they form perhaps the most valuable element in this as compared with other works of the same kind. Mr. Platner has of course made the fullest use of Huelssen's volume issued in continuation of Jordan's *Topographie der Stadt Rom*, and it would be hard to point to any matter of importance in which he has failed to incorporate its suggestions; there can be little doubt, however, that the name *Amphitheatrum Castrense* signifies 'Court Amphitheatre,' as Huelssen explains it (cf. Hirschfeld, *Verwaltungsbeamten*, p. 313, note 3), though Mr. Platner (p. 471, note 2) does not seem to regard the idea with favour. We should have expected a more definite statement of the objections which have been raised by Carter and others to the traditional primacy of the Palatine settlement; the more so as Mr. Platner is generally inclined to give a favourable hearing to new views, such as those of Pinza on the location of the temple of Apollo. The short paragraph on p. 44 f. hardly does justice to the theory in question; and the conclusion, 'while there is much to be said in support of this view, it still seems on the whole less probable than the other,' is cautious but slightly unsatisfying. Nevertheless Mr. Platner's book may be heartily commended as the best manual of its kind; and it deserves to command a wide sale amongst those who are interested in the topography of ancient Rome.

H. STUART JONES.

Glanymor, Sandersfoot, Pembrokeshire.

Life and Letters in Roman Africa. By E. S. BOUCHIER, M.A. Small 8vo. 1 vol. Pp. 128. Oxford: R. H. Blackwell, 1913. 3s. 6d.

THIS is a pleasantly written and easily read essay, which may be useful in con-

veying some idea of Roman civilisation in Africa to readers who are unlikely to consult larger works, or works in languages other than English. The subject is of course so extensive that the picture almost inevitably tends, more on account of the scale than of the treatment, to become somewhat shadowy. The vast achievement of the Romans in promoting agriculture, for example, in their North African possessions, whereby regions which were arid under Carthaginian rule, became fruitful, can hardly be grasped from Mr. Bouchier's handling. Indeed there are phrases on p. 17 which may incline the reader to believe that agriculture decayed under the Romans.

In detail, the book presents a good many blemishes which might easily have been removed by careful revision and verification of the evidence. There is given on p. 14 a description of Carthage between the time of C. Gracchus and that of Caesar, which is entirely misconceived. To mention only one point, it is stated that the Carthaginians made offers during that period to the enemies of Rome, and we are referred to Athenaeus v. 50. That passage consists of rhetorical rant placed in the mouth of the demagogue Athenio, who brought over Athens to the side of Mithridates. He represents all the world as hurrying to the support of the cause, and talks of an embassy from Carthage! The mention on p. 76 of 'the tyrant Tetricus in 265 on his elevation to the throne of Africa' is an error. A quotation is given from the *Historia Augusta*, which refers to Cel-sus, the usurper, who tried to supplant Gallienus, and after seven days was killed and his body eaten by dogs. Of course Tetricus ruled Gaul and Spain for a considerable period. On p. 78 we read of 'priestesses, mostly widows,' who served Ceres-Tanit. The two quotations from Tertullian which are given show that these 'viduae' were women who had deserted their husbands for the sake of the goddess, and were devotees, not priestesses. Some references are wrongly given. In a note on p. 74 'Tert. *Apol.* xv.' should be ix.; and on p. 76 'Ulp. *Fragm.* 226' should be xxii. 6.

Sometimes when Mr. Bouchier repeats opinions widely current, a consideration of the evidence by which they are supported would have suggested doubts. A study of Tertullian's words in *Pall.* I. makes it difficult to understand 'soror civitas' of Rome (p. 15). The authorities do not support very well some statements about human sacrifice on p. 74, in which, for one thing, different ages are not distinguished. Thus Diod. xx. 14. 6 bears on the time of Agathocles. And it is hard to suppose that Tertullian in *Apol.* ix. would speak of the reign of Tiberius as his 'proconsulate' or of the emperor himself as 'proconsul' of Africa. And the reference to Plin. *N. H.* 36, 5 is a puzzle which I cannot solve.

J. S. R.

The Imperial Administrative System in the Ninth Century, with a Revised Text of the Kletorologion of Philotheos. By J. B. BURY. Large 8vo. Pp. 180. London: Published for the British Academy by Henry Frowde, 1911. 2s. 6d. net.

PROFESSOR BURY has produced a work of amazing erudition, which will be welcome to the political and economic historian of the Eastern Empire as well as to those interested in the elaborate Palace organisation of the period. He rightly saw that it was no longer possible to work on the old text of Philotheos in Bekker's Bonn edition of the Byzantine historians, and he has formed a new and vastly superior text, using photographs of the Leipzig MS. (much the best for the whole work) as well as the latest labours of Russian workers on the subject: he has wisely made the work far more convenient for reference by restoring in to its original tabular form.

Of the general conclusions which he draws from Philotheos, using also his wide knowledge of the other documents which throw light upon the period, there is not room here to speak at any length: it must suffice to say that the exposition is both masterly and lucid, and that no work on the administration of the Empire at this time will in future

be able to appear which is not based on this study. He adds a valuable and apparently complete bibliography of the subject, which shows only too clearly that historians of the Empire at this stage will fare very badly without a knowledge of Russian. On p. 10 the word *collection* seems a mis-print for *collation*, or else *MS.* should be *MSS.*

G.

NUMISMATIQUE CONSTANTIN- IENNE.

Numismatique Constantinienne. Par JULES MAURICE. Tome III. Pp. xlviii+286. 8vo, with 11 collotype plates and 4 tables. Paris: Leroux, 1912. Fr. 15.

WITH this volume, containing the four eastern mints, Nicomedia, Cyzicus, Antioch and Alexandria, M. Maurice completes the description of the coinage of the Constantinian period. The four sections dealing with the mints follow the lines with which we are familiar from the earlier volumes, and it is therefore unnecessary to characterise them. An introduction deals with two points; one, the denominations of the bronze coinage from Diocletian to Constantine, will eventually be handled more fully in the general introduction which the author promises as a supplement, and is of purely numismatic interest. But the other question, the influence of the persecution of Maximinus Daza on the coinage, is of more general importance. In the course of his discussion, M. Maurice shows that the altar which appears on the coins struck in the mints of Maximinus is the expression of the obligation laid upon all subjects of the Emperors to sacrifice to the gods, including the Emperor himself. He also shows how the coins illustrate the great importance attached by Maximinus to the cults of the Egyptian gods and of the Sun, and how Egypt exerted its influence, both under Maximinus and Julian, on the organisation of the pagan hierarchy. This introduction cannot well be neglected by students of early Christian history. We look forward eagerly to the supplementary volume which, with

indexes and appendixes, will make M. Maurice's invaluable work complete.
G. F. H.

Papyrus Graecus Holmiensis, Recepte für Silber, Steine und Purpur. VON O. LAGERCRANTZ. Upsala, 1913. 1 vol. 8vo. Pp. 248. 2 Plates.

THE long and well-preserved papyrus here edited has had a singular history. Presented in 1832 to the Swedish Academy of Antiquities by Johann d'Anastasy, then consul for Sweden and Norway at Alexandria, it lay unheeded and forgotten in the National Museum of Stockholm until 1906, when it was transferred to Upsala. Ample justice for past neglect has now been done by the painstaking publication of O. Lagercrantz, who is inclined to err on the side of over-elaboration. The MS. is a single quire of seven tall sheets, written, to judge from the two specimen facsimiles, in the fourth century, and containing a series of chemical formulae for the fabrication of silver, precious stones, and dyes of various kinds. It is nearly related to a Leyden text (X) published in 1885 by Leemanns, which, like the rest of the Leyden group of papyri, was also obtained from d'Anastasy. P. Leyden X is similar both in date and contents, not a few of its formulae recurring in the Stockholm papyrus. Those for precious stones, however, are absent in the former, which on the other hand has a section on gold not represented in the latter. The two papyri thus supplement each other, both apparently being descendants of the Pseudo-Democratean *Φυσικά*, which were also the ultimate source of numerous excerpts in the later Alchemists. In the history of this branch of literature the new text is thus a factor of considerable value.

A. S. H.

Aegean Days. By J. IRVING MANATT. With Illustrations. Murray, 1913.

THIS book made one reader homesick. It brought back to his memory many happy days spent in the isles of Greece,

but one cannot say much more than that. There is very little new observation in it, and its object is not to teach archaeology; it is meant to give pleasure, and it does give pleasure. But not pleasure unalloyed; for there is a great deal of repetition, both stories and phrases coming in over again, which matters little in ephemeral papers but does matter in a book. Even papers on the same subject are not put together; we hop from Andros to Paros and elsewhere, and then back to Andros again. The style also is full of commonplace tags, and has a few American phrases which are not pleasing, nor is the sentimental touch; 'poor Helen' hardly sums up her story, and 'poor Ajax' is the last thing one would say of Ajax.

The account of Naxos is perhaps the best paper in the book, for the remarkable tower of Andros has been described before; but there are several good descriptions, such as the community of monks in Andros, the wise woman, the trampling of roofs (why, O why, did not Mr. Manatt give us the song they sing as they make the roofs?); and there is a vampire story and one piece of observation which I shall quote (p. 176). As they descended from the

heights of Andros, 'the sun was just enough clouded to produce the peculiar effect, familiar to the Homeric poet . . . of the "wine-faced deep." Except immediately inshore, where the colour was a vivid green, the whole sea was a flood of rich red wine—no eye could mistake it, no one could give it any other description. This continued for half an hour, when dense rain-clouds gathered on Kouvári, and the sea darkened into purple.' But Homer becomes a Lesbian (p. 280), and Mr. Manatt is quite bewitched by Dörpfeld; although he 'reserves his judgment,' he clearly inclined to accept all the airy hypothesis which un-Ithacas Ithaca, and 'establishes the poet's highest claims as a geographer' (p. 387). Homer doubtless did not willingly deceive us in geography, but his object was, I imagine, rather to be a poet.

These remarks may convey a wrong impression. The book raised expectations from its size and magnificence, which it does not quite fulfil; but it is written with genuine pleasure, and it gives pleasure to read, which would have been even greater if it had been pruned of what is trivial or repeated.

W. H. D. ROUSE.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editors of THE CLASSICAL REVIEW.

SIR,—In 'Etymologies and Derivations' (*Classical Quarterly*, January, 1914) Mr. E. W. Fay speaks of *gurgēs* as meaning 'eddy' (p. 57).

I think it is difficult to establish this meaning. *Gurgēs* is used by Livy merely as the opposite to *vadum*, and I think it only means something in which you can be swallowed up, not something that goes round and round. In other words, it is a synonym for *vorago* (and thus it is used by Cicero), and not for *vertex*.

This view is in no way adverse to Mr. Fay's explanation of the meaning and derivation of the word; indeed, it rather helps it than otherwise.

I am, sir,
Yours faithfully,
M. T. TATHAM.

Northcourt House, Abingdon.

To the Editors of THE CLASSICAL REVIEW.

DEAR SIR,—I beg a few lines of your space in order to advertise among scholars a project for a *Lexicon Terentianum*, on which Mr. Patrick M'Glynn, George Clark Fellow in the University of Glasgow, is now engaging. The utility of some more exact and complete analysis of Terence's language than the Delphin and Lemaire indices needs no emphasizing. Mr. M'Glynn is planning his work on the model of Merguet's *Vergil-Lexicon*, giving contexts.

As the undertaking is laborious and lengthy, it would be deplorable if, for want of announcement made betimes, anybody else should set about the same. This notice is intended to avert the risk of duplication.

Yours faithfully,
J. S. PHILLIMORE.

5, The College, Glasgow, December 6, 1913.

VERSION

'Oh, silver girl! oh, silver girl! have
pity now,' I cried,
'Long years I knew my mother earth
and knew no thing beside;
Now you have called me from my peace
to kill me with disdain,
Give me a kiss, or let me be Mad Harry
yet again.
I cannot hear your blessed hymn, be-
cause your body cries
A louder, sweeter song, that takes my
spirit by surprise;
Sin should not wear so fine a dress, and
I would have you know
It is not fair of God to tempt a poor old
sinner so.'

The silver girl thought east and west,
she wondered north and south,
And there was laughter in her eyes and
in her lovely mouth;
She stood a-plucking at her dress and
nodding of her head,
'It seems to me I've taught this
damned old fool too much,' she said.

R. MIDDLETON.

'O nostri miserere, nympha,' dixi,
'O argentea nympha, nam per annos
terram matrem ego noueram, nec ultra
quidquam; cum tamen e quiete motum
me fastuque odioque perdidisti,
da mi basia, da, precor, trecenta,
aut da sim Lycidas, ut ante, Demens.
Non sanctam bibere aure cantilenam
possum, corpus enim tuum uenustum
sonat splendidius quid et canorum,
inuaditque meam repente mentem;
non in ueste ita conuenit nitente
peccatrix spatietur ut per urbem,
et te scire uelim Jouem esse iniquum
qui tantum alliciat senem misellum.'

Versat cuncta animo modo huc, modo
illuc,
admirata puella susque deque,
subridens oculis et ore pulcro;
tum uellens tunicam, caputque quas-
sans,
respondit, 'satis ah! satis superque
insulsum hunc docui senem, ut uide-
tur.'

R. C. S.

OBITUARY

ANOTHER great German Latinist has gone from us, the Göttingen Professor, Friedrich Leo. It is hard to realise that he has gone. Only a few months ago I got a bright, kindly letter from him about an edition of Festus. And certainly the brilliant first volume, just published, of his *History of Roman Literature* gave not the slightest indication of any weakening of bodily or mental power. Yet he had accomplished in his lifetime the work of ten men — editions of Virgil's *Culex*, of Seneca's *Tragedies*, of Venantius Fortunatus, of Plautus, of Juvenal, and Persius, contributions to an edition of the fragments of the early tragedians, an exhaustive treatment of Plautine Metre, of Saturnian Verse, of the whole history of Roman Comedy (for his *Plautinische Forschungen* has no narrower a

range), of monologue in the Greek and Latin drama. These are merely the chief items on the list. The full list of his writings would fill several pages. And to all this we must add his wonderful work as professor at Göttingen, as joint-editor of *Hermes*, as a director of the *Thesaurus*. Mommsen may have achieved more, but (in his generation at least) only Mommsen.

Of all that Leo did, probably the greatest thing was his work on Plautus. It must have been the performance which brought him most gratification. For, after long endurance of unfriendly criticism, due to a too hasty attempt on this author, he lived to see his final and matured treatment of the text command universal respect. His years of fighting ended in a great triumph. But I have sometimes

thought that they were the cause of that tendency to pessimism which seemed now and then to lead him astray in his investigations, and, if this be not an ungracious remark, of a slight unwillingness to make concessions to adverse criticism. For any German professor, and above all for one enthroned as Leo was in his Göttingen professorship, to yield to criticism must be a far harder task than we in England find it. Freytag's novel, *Die Verlorene Handschrift*, shows us a state of things which we here can hardly realise, the students of the Seminar identifying themselves with their professor's researches, glorying in his successes and mortified by his failures. Loyalty to such 'Commilitonen' must prevent him from hauling down the flag until the very last moment.

If Leo's work on Plautus had a

weak side, the cause lay in his want of sympathy with Comparative Philology. His studies in this field had never, I fancy, gone beyond Buecheler's *Altlateinische Deklination* and Ritschl's *Prolegomena*. Where he excelled was in his knowledge of the Greek Drama and of the conditions under which the Greek and Roman plays were edited by ancient scholars. Here he owed much to his colleague, Professor von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf. The conjunction of these two bright constellations was indeed a happy omen for Plautine study. It is sad to think that the *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* has been left unfinished; but how thankful we must be for all that he had lived to achieve!

W. M. LINDSAY.

The University of St. Andrews.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Publishers and Authors forwarding Books for review are asked to send at the same time a note of the price.

* * Excerpts and Extracts from Periodicals and Collections are not included in these Lists unless stated to be separately published.

American Journal of Philology. Edited by B. L. Gildersleeve. Vol. XXXIV. 4. Pp. 381-514. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1914.

Bardt (C.) Römische Charakterköpfe in Briefen. 9" x 6". Pp. xviii + 434. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913. M. 9.

Baring-Gould (S.) A Book of Folk Lore (The Nation's Library). 6½" x 4½". Pp. 264. London: Collins' Clear Type Press. Cloth, 1s. net.

Besnier (M.) Lexique de Géographie Ancienne. 7" x 4½". Pp. xx + 893. Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1914. Cloth, Fr. 10.

Birt (T.) Kritik und Hermeneutik nebst Abriss des antiken Buchwesens. 10" x 6½". Pp. xii + 395. München: O. Beck, 1913. M. 7.50.

Cagnat (R.) Cours d'Épigraphie Latine (4^{me} édition, revue et augmentée; avec 28 planches hors texte). 10" x 6½". Pp. xxviii + 504. Paris: Fontemoing et Cie., 1914.

Classical Association: Bombay Branch. Proceedings, 1912-13. With Rules and List of Members. 8½" x 5½". Pp. 82. Rs. 1.8 net.

Classical Philology: A Quarterly Journal devoted to Research in the Languages, Literature, History, and Life of Classical Antiquity. Vol. IX., No. 1. January,

1914. 9½" x 6½". Pp. viii + 1-112. University of Chicago Press.

Diès (A.) La Transposition Platonicienne. 10" x 7". Pp. 44. Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1913. Le Socrate de Platon. 9½" x 6½". Pp. 412-434. Kain (Belgique): Le Saulchoir, 1913. Note sur l'Ἐλένης Ἐγκώμιον de Gorgias. 10" x 6½". Pp. 192-208. Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1913. Revue Critique d'Histoire de la Philosophie Antique. 9½" x 6½". Pp. 1-32. Paris: M. Rivière, 1913.

Draheim (H.) Die Lieder des Horaz, lateinisch und deutsch in Auswahl. 7½" x 5". Pp. 228. Berlin: G. Grote, 1913. Paper boards, M. 4.

Ferguson (W. D.) The Legal Terms Common to the Macedonian Inscriptions and the New Testament. 10" x 7". Pp. 110. Chicago Press, Illinois; and Cambridge: University Press, 1913. 3s. net.

Haverfield (F.) Ancient Town Planning. 9" x 6". Pp. 152. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913. Paper boards, 6s. net.

Heisenberg (A.) and Wenger (L.) Veröffentlichungen aus der Papyrus-Sammlung der K. Hof- und Staatsbibliothek zu München 1 Byzantinische Papyri, Mit xxxvii. Tafeln in Lichtdruck. Text, 12" x 9", pp. x + 203; photographs, 22½" x 16½". Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1914. M. 28.

- Hirschfeld* (O.) *Kleine Schriften*. 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. x+1012. Berlin: Weidmann, 1913. M. 30.
- Homer*. *Der Dichter und seine Welt* (Erster Teil) von Georg Finsler. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. xvi+460. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1914. M. 5.
- Homerische Aufsätze*. Von Dr. Adolph Roemer. 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. vi+216. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1914. M. 8.
- Klassiker der Archäologie*. Band III., L. Ross, Inselreisen II. Teil, pp. xii+168, M. 3.50. Band IV., F. G. Welcker, Zoega's Leben, II. Teil, pp. iv+261, M. 4. 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ " x 6". Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1913.
- Larfeld* (W.) *Griechische Epigraphik*. 10" x 6 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. xii+536, mit 4 Tafeln. München: C. H. Beck, 1914. M. 10.
- Linen* (Teachers' Edition) By Professors Walters and Conway. Being the Fourth Edition of *Linen*, with the addition of Suggestions for Teachers in the Oral Method. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5". Pp. xxiv+375+24. London: John Murray, 1913. Cloth, 3s.
- Majer-Leonhard* (E.) *Ἀγάμναροι qui litteras sciverint qui resciverint ex papyris graecis quantum fieri potest exploratur*. 10" x 8". Pp. 78. Frankfurt-on-Main: Diekmann, 1913. M. 6.
- Martha* (J.) *La Langue Étrusque*. 10" x 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. xiv+494. Paris: E. Le Roux, 1913.
- Masqueray* (P.) *Bibliographie Pratique de la Littérature Grecque*. 8" x 5". Pp. vi+334. Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1914. Fr. 5.
- Mensel* (F.) *Edmund Burke und die französische Revolution*. 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ " x 6". Pp. viii+150. Berlin: Weidmann, 1913. M. 5.
- Monist* (The) *A Quarterly Magazine devoted to the Philosophy of Science*. Vol. XXIV., No. 1. January, 1914. 10" x 8". Pp. viii+1-160. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company. 2s. 6d.
- More* (P. E.) *The Paradox of Oxford* (Humanistic Papers, Second Series, III.). 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. 19. Michigan University Bulletin, June, 1913.
- Moulton* (J. H.) *Early Zoroastrianism* (Hibbert Lectures, Second Series). 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. xx+468. London: Williams and Norgate, 1913. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net.
- Norden* (E.) *Josephus und Tacitus, über Jesus Christus und eine messianische Prophetie*. 10 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 7 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". Pp. 30. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913. M. 1.
- Pankhurst* (C.) *The Great Scourge, and How to End it*. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. xii+155. London: E. Pankhurst, 1913. Cloth.
- Powers* (H. H.) *The Message of Greek Art*. 8" x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. x+336. London: Macmillan and Co., 1913. Cloth, 8s. 6d. net.
- Preussische Jahrbücher* (Delbrück). Band 154, Heft 3. 9" x 6". Pp. 389-580. Berlin: G. Stilke, 1913. M. 2.50.
- Quiggin* (E. C.) *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway on his Sixtieth Birthday*. 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 6 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". Pp. xxv+656. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. Cloth. 25s. net.
- Rabbow* (P.) *Antike Schriften über Seelenheilung und Seelenleitung. I. Die Therapie des Zorus*. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. vi+198. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1914. M. 6.
- Rasi* (P.) *Bibliografia Virgiliana (1910-11)*. 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 6 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. 128. Mantua: G. Mondovi, 1913. L. 10.
- Riese* (A.) *Das Rheinische Germanien in den Antiken Inschriften*. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. xii+480. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1914. M. 18.
- Roper* (A. G.) *Ancient Eugenics*. 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 5". Pp. iv+74. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1913. Cloth, 2s. 6d. net.
- Royds* (T. F.) *The Beasts, Birds, and Bees of Virgil*. 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 5". Pp. xviii+108. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1914. Cloth, 3s. 6d. net.
- Schissel von Fleschenberg* (O.) *Entwicklungsgeschichte der griechischen Romanen in Aliterum*. 7 $\frac{3}{8}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". Pp. xx+110. Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1913. M. 3.40.
- Sophokles* (Antigone) IV Band, 11te Auflage, besorgt von E. Bruhn. 8" x 5". Pp. 222. Berlin: Weidmann, 1913. M. 2.20.
- Taccone* (A.) *Gli Idilli di Teocrito, tradotti in versi Italiani, con introduzione e note*. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. xx+298. Torino: Fr. Bocca, 1914. L. 6.
- Teubner's Texts*. Hesiodi Carmina (Rzach), pp. vi+268, M. 1.50. M. Annaei Lucani Belli Civilis (Hosius), Libri X., pp. lx+395, M. 4.40. Miracula S. Georgii (Aufhauser), pp. xvi+178, M. 4. P. Cornelii Taciti Libri qui supersunt (Halm), Tomus Prior, pp. iv+382+54, M. 1.50. Olympiodori Philosophi in Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria (Norvin), pp. xi+272, M. 5. Corpus Agrimensorum Romanorum (Thulin), Vol. I., Fasc. I., pp. iv+172, M. 7. Apulei Platonici Metamorphoseon (Helm), Libri XI., pp. viii+296, M. 3. Andocidis Orationes (Blass), pp. xxii+124, M. 1.50. Pindari Carmina (Schroeder), pp. xiv+372, M. 2.40. Philodemi de Ira Liber (Wilke), pp. liv+115, M. 3.60. Repertorium Lateinischer Wörterverzeichnisse und Speziallexika (Rowald), pp. 22, M. 0.60. 6 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913.
- Verrall* (A. W.) *Euripides the Rationalist: A Study in the History of Art and Religion*. 9" x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. x+280. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. (Reprint.) Cloth, 7s. 6d. net.
- Weller* (C. H.) *Athens and its Monuments*. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. xxiv+412. New York: The Macmillan Co. Cloth, 17s. net.
- Whitehouse* (J. H.) *A National System of Education*. 9" x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. viii+92. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. Cloth, 2s. 6d. net.
- Winbolt* (S. E.) *Bell's Simplified Latin Classics: The Agricola of Tacitus*, pp. x+92; *Sallust's Catiline*, pp. x+98. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". London: Geo. Bell and Sons, 1913. Cloth, 1s. 6d.